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Abstract: 
 
Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers 
they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the 
disagreement.  This looks epistemically irresponsible.  I offer a detailed investigation of 
this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade.  I argue that although in some cases 
the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is 
significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in 
which the situation arises the renegade is blameworthy in her disagreement with 
recognized epistemic superiors.  I also offer some thoughts on what it would mean for 
philosophical practice for us to refrain from being renegades.  Finally, I show how a new 
kind of radical skepticism emerges from modest theses regarding the renegade. 
 
1. The Epistemic Renegade Problem 
 
It’s not terribly important on which claim David Lewis and I disagree.  It might be some claim about 
modality, for instance.  The problem is that even though he held that ¬P while I hold that P, I know full 
well that he was my epistemic superior with regard to the issues surrounding P.  Lewis could kick my 
philosophical ass when it comes to modality—or just about any issue in metaphysics for that matter.  
Not only that: he put much more thought into the question whether P than I ever will.  He is my 
epistemic superior in just about every way when it comes to modality, I fully admit it, and yet I say that 
he’s wrong and I’m right on that very topic.  Things might be different if I actually did serious research in 
metaphysics, but I don’t; my areas of expertise lie elsewhere.  And of course, this has nothing in 
particular to do with Lewis or metaphysics.  For instance, Saul Kripke, Crispin Wright, Timothy 
Williamson, David Chalmers, Bas van Fraasen, and a large and embarrassing number of other 
contemporary philosophers are my epistemic superiors in a huge range of areas as well, and yet I 
disagree with them even though I admit that they are my epistemic superiors on the very issues we 
disagree about. 
 
Doesn’t this mean that there is something deeply wrong with me?  Are philosophers of average abilities 
just overwhelmingly and incurably arrogant?  Shouldn’t I withhold belief, or at least reduce my 
confidence level, once I discover that some of my recognized epistemic superiors disagree with that 
belief?  More generally, what philosophical beliefs are professional philosophers epistemically blameless 
in holding?  How should we conduct our philosophical lives? 
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This situation arises not just with respect to philosophical belief.  There are many occasions in which we 
believe P even though we know full well that there are experts who believe the opposite while being our 
epistemic superiors in just about every relevant way with regard to P and the topics surrounding P.  Even 
though the problem generalizes, the philosophical case is particularly interesting given how reflective 
we are.  It also hits close to home.1 
 
By ‘epistemic superior regarding P’ I mean to indicate something strong.  Someone S is my epistemic 
superior regarding P if and only if all of the following hold: 
 
 S is generally more informed than I am on the topics involving P. 
 S has more raw intelligence than I do. 
 S has thought and investigated whether P is true longer and in more depth than I have. 
 S has thought about and investigated the topics surrounding P longer and in more depth 
than I have. 
 S is just as or even more intellectually careful than I am. 
 S is no more relevantly biased than I am. 
 S has understood and fairly and thoroughly evaluated all the significant evidence and 
reasons I have regarding P (and usually a great deal more evidence and reasons).2 
 
Call someone my recognized epistemic superior with respect to P just in case I know that she is my 
epistemic superior with respect to P. 
 
When I say that we know that so-and-so is our epistemic superior I don’t mean we dwell on that fact 
whenever we reflect on our belief in P.  Nor do I mean that we have consciously thought about and 
explicitly accepted each of the components of my above characterization of epistemic superiority with 
                                               
1 I’ll have more to say on non-philosophical cases later in the essay. 
2 I don’t mean to suggest that if A is B’s epistemic superior with respect to P, then A knows P and B 
doesn’t.  Nor do I mean that A’s belief is true while B’s is false.  Nor do I mean that A’s belief is more 
justified or epistemically better than B’s.  Nor do I mean that A is more reliable at arriving at the truth 
regarding the topic at hand.  There’s more on reliability in section 3. 
I can’t define ‘raw intelligence’ (as it occurs in my characterization of epistemic superiority), but what I 
have in mind should be clear to teachers.  It is easy to spot the undergraduates who are intellectually very 
quick, go right to the heart of the issues, don’t get sidetracked with irrelevant or peripheral issues, display 
creativity in thinking through possible approaches, etc.  Think of the glowing things you write in only 
moderately inflated or even honest letters of recommendation for your best students.  These are usually 
the ones with high “raw intelligence”. 
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respect to P.  Although I don’t want any requirement that stringent, I do want something a bit stronger 
than ‘We are disposed to correctly accept that so-and-so fits all the superiority conditions’.  I want 
something realistic, something that actually applies to many of us philosophers who are confident 
enough to disagree with Lewis regarding some metaphysical claim, say, and yet wise and reflective 
enough to readily admit and be at least partially aware that he knew and understood quite a bit more 
than we do regarding the topics directly relevant to the claim in question.  I want to pick out an 
epistemic situation we often actually find ourselves in when we contemplate how our views conflict 
with those had by people we know full well to be better philosophers than we are in these areas.  But 
I’m not sure what that really amounts to; as a result I won’t offer stipulations regarding ‘epistemic 
superior’ or ‘know that so-and-so is my epistemic superior’. 
 
Perhaps something along these lines conveys the relevant kind of awareness of disagreement in the face 
of epistemic superiority: 
 
 I have consciously recognized that Lewis believes the opposite of what I believe. 
 I have consciously recognized that he knows and understands quite a bit more about the 
topics germane to P than I do. 
 I am disposed to accept virtually all of the conditions in the above characterization of 
epistemic superiority with respect to P, applied to Lewis and myself. 
 I am disposed to admit he’s my epistemic superior while simultaneously realizing that 
we disagree regarding P. 
 
I may not have ever actually said, all in one breath, ‘Lewis is my epistemic superior regarding P but I’m 
right and he’s wrong about P’, but I have admitted in one way or another all four bulleted conditions on 
several occasions.  The fundamental problem—I seem epistemically blameworthy in believing P—is 
worse, perhaps, if I have asserted all the conditions in one breath.  But even without the simultaneous 
assertion, I don’t look too good. 
 
Call the person who knows that her belief is denied by recognized epistemic superiors the reflective 
epistemic renegade.  So the renegade isn’t someone who merely believes P even though she has 
epistemic superiors who believe ¬P.  It’s stronger than that: the renegade knows that she believes P and 
she knows that the epistemic superiors believe ¬P and are her epistemic superiors regarding P; she is a 
reflective renegade.  I will say that these philosophers are in the Epistemic Renegade situation.  Finally, 
the Epistemic Renegade problem is the problem of figuring out whether the renegade is blameworthy in 
continuing with her belief in P. 
 
It is a good question what terms can be substituted in for ‘know’ in ‘Someone is my “recognized” 
epistemic superior with respect to P just in case I know that she is my epistemic superior with respect to 
P’ in order for the renegade problem to have bite.  Is it enough that I just believe that so-and-so is my 
superior?  Or do I have to justifiably believe it?  Does my belief in so-and-so’s superiority have to be 
true?  I will sidestep these questions by focusing on real-life cases, in which (setting aside skepticism) I 
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know full well that, for instance, Lewis was my epistemic superior when it came to the ontology of 
material objects. 
 
I suspect that most philosophers are reflective epistemic renegades with respect to some of their 
philosophical opinions.  If you’re an epistemologist, then you will be a renegade with respect to an 
epistemological issue only if you really think that you have disagreeing superiors on that issue.  You may 
be perfectly reasonable in thinking that you have no such superiors, even though Ernie Sosa, for 
instance, disagrees with you on the issue in question.  Of course, you might be Ernie Sosa.  But even if 
you aren’t you may well think that even though Sosa’s a better epistemologist than you are, you 
reasonably think that you’re actually pretty expert on the issue at hand.  You think of Sosa more as a 
peer on that issue, even though you admit he’s your superior on other issues, including epistemological 
ones.  When it comes to the philosophy of language or metaphysics, however, you’ll admit that you 
have many more superiors, but you may have far fewer controversial beliefs in that area, thereby 
diminishing the frequency of the renegade situation. 
 
My main question in this essay is this: under what conditions are reflective epistemic renegades 
epistemically blameworthy or blameless in continuing to believe P once they realize that recognized 
epistemic superiors believe ¬P?3  It’s not the belief state itself or the initial coming to have that belief 
state that is in question; it’s the retaining of it.  On the face of it, I should—epistemically should—give up 
my belief once I recognize that people I admit are my epistemic superiors regarding P believe ¬P.  Or, if 
I’m currently on the fence regarding P but strongly inclined to believe it, then given that I have reflected 
on the fact that some of my admitted epistemic superiors hold ¬P, I should refrain from coming to 
believe P. 
 
An early objection: one might initially think it’s obvious that I can reasonably disagree with someone I 
know to be an epistemic superior regarding the issue at hand.  After all, it’s not as if the superior is 
infallible.  Philosophy is awfully difficult, and the phenomenon of widespread disagreement proves that 
even our best and brightest philosophers get things wrong quite frequently.  But this observation cuts 
both ways: how can I reasonably think that it’s the superior philosopher who got things wrong in the 
case at hand?  I know perfectly well that I’m fallible too; and I also have admitted up front that the 
philosopher disagreeing with me is my superior with regard to the relevant issues; so isn’t it more likely 
that I’m the one who has got things wrong this time around?  This little line of argument proves nothing, 
but it does suggest that it’s not so easy to reasonably disagree with recognized epistemic superiors. 
 
Of course, we do not have complete control over our beliefs.  But in many everyday circumstances 
similar to the Epistemic Renegade situation it is obvious that the epistemic charge ‘You should not 
continue with your belief’ is true.  When it comes to scientific matters, for instance, we change our 
                                               
3 In other published (2005a, 2005b, 2008a, 2008b) and unpublished work I have examined closely related 
questions, especially emphasizing how “live” scientific-philosophical theories with radical consequences 
ruin one’s chances at large classes of everyday knowledge. 
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beliefs accordingly all the time when we discover that the experts disagree with us; and if we don’t do so 
we are being epistemically naughty.  For instance, on Monday you believe that Jupiter has about 20 
moons.  You’ve believed this for years, based on what you read about astronomy.  Then on Tuesday you 
talk to your friend the physics professor who tells you that astronomers have now catalogued over 40 
moons of Jupiter.  Obviously, you should give up your old belief; you should know better than to stick 
with your old belief.  I will simply assume that such epistemic ‘should’ judgments are often true (even 
though those judgments might come out false on alternative interpretations, due to polysemy).  I will 
make a few conjectures about how to understand the relevant epistemic judgment later in the essay. 
 
Recently there has been some illuminating work on the epistemic problems of peer disagreement.4  Two 
people disagree regarding P (i.e., one believes it while the other believes its negation) even though they 
are equal in intelligence, biases, and intellectual care—both generally and with regard to the topics 
surrounding P.  They have also been exposed to the same evidence and have worked on it comparably 
long, carefully, etc.  They are epistemic peers with respect to P.  Not only that: they know, or at least 
firmly believe, that they are peers.  Such a situation generates several good questions, but I think it 
virtually never shows up in either philosophy or politics, for instance.  In order for philosophers Fred and 
George to be peers in this sense they would have to have the same evidence regarding P, and 
presumably that would mean that they have read just about the very same literature on P (not every 
article, but surely the main ones).  But that virtually never happens in philosophy; I don’t think we even 
come close to it in most circumstances, as there is quite a bit of diversity in professional philosophy even 
regarding our reading of the “central” works.  Often the Peter van Inwagen (1996) example of his 
disagreement with David Lewis regarding the compatibility of free will and determinism is cited as an 
actual case of recognized disagreement with equal evidence, but I have a hard time believing that those 
two philosophers had considered literally the same evidence—even if we mean by ‘same’ approximate 
sameness.  And of course if by chance they had seen the very same evidence, they probably wouldn’t be 
a position to reasonably think they had.  I can’t name even one epistemic peer of mine with regard to 
any interesting philosophical issue, even on a relaxed interpretation of ‘epistemic peer’.  I know of 
plenty of philosophers who are roughly as intelligent and intellectually careful as me, but that’s not 
enough for peerage.  It’s virtually never true that they have read just about the same literature on the 
topic in question as I have. 
 
And even if they have, and by some miracle I know that fact, I haven’t much of any idea what thoughts 
went through their minds while digesting that literature—and that’s a factor crucial in determining 
peerness in the intuitive sense.  How one digests a philosophical work is often highly dependent on 
one’s familiarity with what initially may strike someone else—including an approximate epistemic 
peer—as irrelevant philosophical material.  Furthermore, how one digests a philosophical work is highly 
dependent on what connections happen to pop into one’s mind while thinking about the work’s 
                                               
4 For instance, see Feldman 2006 and 2007, Kelly 2006 and 2008, Elga 2007, White 2005, Lackey 
forthcoming A and forthcoming B, and Christensen 2007.  For an introduction to some of the main 
questions on this topic, see my 2009 or Christensen 2009. 
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content—a factor that is highly variable.  Finally, I may approach a philosophical issue in a way 
completely different from that taken by someone else, even if that person is of the same abilities and 
has read the same literature.  For instance, I might approach issues with ‘What is the logic of the 
position here?  And has the position been filled out thoroughly?’, whereas someone else might focus 
almost entirely on ‘Is the view as defended true?  Are the supporting arguments conclusive?’  So it 
seems unlikely, given differences in personal history, memory, approaches, and interests, that any two 
people digest the same bit of literature in the same way—even with a relaxed notion of ‘same way’.  
Furthermore, unlike my rough peer I may be the type of person who is epistemically very cautious, 
valuing the avoidance of false beliefs and blind alleys much more than the acquisition of true beliefs and 
promising lines of argument (for instance; there are other ways we can differ in epistemic values); if so, 
then we may be epistemically quite different.  It’s easy enough to define a relatively clear notion of 
philosophical peerage, but in order to engage with practical concerns—which are my focus in this 
essay—we need peerage to actually happen and be known to happen.  However, the Epistemic 
Renegade situation, which focuses not on peerage but superiority, clearly does have plenty of real-life 
application.5 
 
In this essay I will be offering a mixed solution to the Epistemic Renegade problem, arguing for two main 
theses, although the former will receive the bulk of support here (the latter is more thoroughly treated 
in my unpublished work). 
 
Favorable Thesis: there might be four (or more; I don’t know about this) real-life (and not 
heavily idealized) species of the Epistemic Renegade situation in which the reflective epistemic 
renegade is not blameworthy in virtue of being a reflective epistemic renegade (of course her 
holding of her belief might be blameworthy for some other reason). 
 
Unfavorable Thesis: if (a) one is a reflective epistemic renegade with respect to one’s belief in P, 
and (b) one isn’t in any of the four exception cases, then one’s retaining P is blameworthy. 
  
Note that the Favorable Thesis has the consequence that I’m blameless in disagreeing with an epistemic 
peer as well as a superior (if I’m epistemically entitled to disagree with the superior, then surely I’m okay 
in disagreeing with the peer); so my theses have bearing on the peer problem.  If my theses are true, 
then the straightforward responses to the peer problem, ‘Stick with your belief’, ‘Stick with your belief if 
it was the justified one in the first place, before the discovery of disagreement’, and ‘Give up your belief 
                                               
5 One might suspect that many reasons for belief are incommunicable, in practice if not in theory.  If so, 
then it might seem difficult to know that so-and-so is my epistemic superior on some issue, as that 
requires me to know that so-and-so has virtually all my evidence and reasons regarding P.  But I think that 
once we proceed to real cases of disagreement in philosophy the worry very often (though not always) is 
idle.  For instance, there is no reason I know of to think that I have some good reason for my belief 
against instantaneous temporal parts that Ted Sider lacks. 
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or significantly lower your confidence in it’, are incorrect.  In addition to arguing for those two theses, I 
will suggest that the problem arises significantly less frequently than it appears (for reasons I’ll describe 
in section 4), even when we are aware of our lower level of expertise compared to that of our superiors.  
Finally, and provocatively, the Unfavorable Thesis leads to a kind of radical skepticism significantly 
different from and more plausible than traditional forms of skepticism.6 
 
One could be forgiven for initially thinking that it’s pretty clear that one is blameworthy in at least the 
most obvious instances of the Epistemic Renegade situation, that there are no good reasons to think 
otherwise, and that therefore this essay is investigating a thesis of no importance.  (Notice that this 
objection is precisely the reverse of the “early objection” noted a few paragraphs back.)  However, for 
almost any interesting philosophical claim P that I’m aware that I have, I know of two people who are 
my epistemic superiors with respect to P and they disagree with one another.7  How can I reasonably 
either believe P or disbelieve P (i.e. believe ¬P) in such a situation?  No matter what I do, I’ll have to 
admit that I’m disagreeing with an epistemic superior.  Thus, it seems that the reasonable thing to do, 
for those of us who are reflective enough to know of our relative philosophical ability and 
understanding, is to withhold judgment on most every worthwhile philosophical claim.  Most 
philosophers will find this distasteful.  Still, it might not sound that hard to alter one’s epistemic 
practices so as to not fall into the Epistemic Renegade situation anymore.  But once one starts actually 
listing one’s philosophical beliefs and noting which ones are known perfectly well to be denied by 
recognized epistemic superiors, one sees how difficult it is to follow the advice, and not merely nod 
one’s head at it.  This is especially true for those who like me are generalists, working in several areas.  
And no cheating: it’s no good, I think, to insist that despite all the verbal and written evidence to the 
contrary, one has no beliefs for which the Epistemic Renegade problem comes up.  That’s almost always 
disingenuous; I don’t think I’ve ever met more than a few philosophy professors who weren’t reflective 
epistemic renegades.8  Look through your own writings and list the claims you’ve defended or, better, 
                                               
6 One could argue for blameworthiness not via contemporary disagreement but via the diversity of super-
expert opinion throughout history (e.g., Hume, Kant, and Aristotle) on major philosophical issues (e.g., 
compatibilism, the existence of universals).  I think this argument merits investigating (although I’m 
inclined to think it will fail), but in this essay I will confine my attention to the problem of recognized 
contemporary epistemic superior disagreement, particularly as it shows up in philosophy.  Only by 
sticking with contemporaries can we fruitfully compare bodies of evidence. 
7 Actually, this is misleading, as I personally have almost no even remotely controversial philosophical 
beliefs (not even that there are chairs or rocks, although I do indeed believe that 2 + 2 isn’t 57).  This puts 
me well out of the mainstream; for the sake of the arguments in this essay its protagonist is somewhat 
fictional. 
8 It isn’t clear to me how many students really fit the conditions for being epistemic renegades, since 
many of them don’t believe that David Lewis, for instance, is their epistemic superior when it comes to 
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explicitly assumed as “obvious” or “clear” or “evident” or “manifest” or “certain” or “definite” or 
“unmistakable” or “inevitable” or “indisputable” or “surely right”, and then note how many of those put 
you in the Epistemic Renegade situation.  Better yet: grab a few journals and consider how many of the 
defended theses you believe to be false, even though others who you admit to be your superiors think 
they are true.  Maybe best: in relatively private encounters see what your philosophical colleagues and 
acquaintances say about various philosophical theories (e.g., “All that crap that’s been published on 
possible worlds”).  You need to deal with genuine modal realism, propositional attitude eliminativism, 
moral error theory, color error theory, dialetheism, epistemicism, virtually every mature and defended 
metaphysical view about ordinary physical objects, and dozens of other counterintuitive theories 
supported by some of our best and brightest. 
 
2. Clarifying the Problem 
 
Our general problem is a large and personal one: what philosophical beliefs should I have?  I like to think 
of the more particular problem—should I continue with my renegade ways?—in the following 
convenient and illuminating way.  I say P, where P is some controversial bit of philosophy.  Then my five-
year-old daughter says ¬P.  I’m not too worried that I might be mistaken.  The fact that she disagrees 
with me gives me no good reason to doubt my belief.  Then an undergraduate philosophy major of 
average abilities says ¬P.  I’m still not worried that my belief in P is mistaken.  Then I discover that many 
of my epistemic peers (where we construe ‘peer’ so that it actually applies in such a way that I can 
identify philosophical peers as peers) regarding P and the topics surrounding P say that ¬P.  Now I’m a 
bit worried but hardly upset.  Then I die, knowingly come face to face with God, and God says that the 
truth is definitely ¬P.  At this point only an idiot would retain his belief in P.  Surely at this point I have to 
admit I was wrong—or at least withhold judgment!  It seems that there is a continuum of degree of 
blameworthiness.  In the situation with the five-year-old, I’m not blameworthy in persisting with my 
belief (degree zero); in the situation with God I’m a moron if I retain my belief (just about the highest 
degree of blameworthiness); these claims are hard to contest.  Our issue is whether people in the 
Epistemic Renegade situation are in a bad enough position among this continuum to be blameworthy. 
 
In the rest of this section I’ll offer two comments meant to further clarify the Epistemic Renegade 
problem.  Then in the remaining sections, I’ll try to determine when reflective epistemic renegades are 
or are not blameworthy. 
 
First point.  We are not questioning the choice of research direction of the renegade philosopher.  There 
is nothing at all wrong, I submit, with choosing to pursue a line of reasoning or theory based on an 
assumption that one knows full well is denied by many, even the vast majority, of one’s recognized 
epistemic superiors.  None of the arguments of this essay suggest otherwise; there is nothing here to 
                                                                                                                                                       
metaphysics.  This is not to say that they believe that he isn’t their superior; it’s to say that they haven’t 
thought it through enough to become renegades.  Keep in mind that being a renegade requires quite of bit 
of sober reflection (although a realistic amount); it isn’t unreflective epistemic recklessness. 
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stifle research.  For one thing, one simply must choose some research project with underlying 
assumptions; otherwise it would be very difficult to do any research at all.  And in most cases if one is 
going to do any research that has a chance of being interesting, one is going to be making some 
assumptions that are denied by recognized epistemic superiors.  This is especially true for me, since I am 
an average philosopher who will probably not have the originality to embark on an interesting line of 
research resting on uncontroversial assumptions.  So I’m pretty much forced to be a “research 
renegade”.  In any case, there are good reasons for strongly encouraging people to be research 
renegades.  One is not similarly forced to believe the assumptions underlying one’s research or the 
conclusions derived from them.  What looks unwise is believing that the superiors are wrong; the focus 
is on belief, not action.  Clearly, one can vigorously pursue a line of thought based on a controversial 
assumption without believing the conclusions derived along the way.  Being a reflective research 
renegade is one thing; being a reflective epistemic renegade (‘reflective doxastic renegade’ is more 
descriptive but uglier) is something else.  So in one sense the answer to ‘How should we conduct our 
philosophical lives?’ is ‘With complete freedom!’, as there is little reason (from disagreement alone) to 
restrict action.9  I’ll return to this point in section 5. 
 
Second point.  What exactly is the alleged epistemic blameworthiness in question?  Maybe in these 
cases it is just good old irrationality.  But the charge of irrationality is too general and ambiguous to be 
informative.  Furthermore, to my ears anyway the accusation of irrationality typically conveys a major 
insult—at least for a professional philosopher with regard to her professional philosophizing.  I want to 
tentatively charge those of us in the Epistemic Renegade situation with something like hit-and-run, with 
no injuries, on a side street, in snowy conditions, at 15 or 20 mph, and with just some dents and scrapes 
on the parked car; not plowing into a crowd of pedestrians while drunk. 
 
The kind of blameworthiness in question is best given with examples.  As a graduate student in physics I 
work on a problem in advanced classical mechanics, say, and then find that my answer isn’t the same as 
my professor’s, which in turn matches the answer key in the back of the physics textbook.  Wouldn’t I be 
pretty foolish to continue to believe that my answer is the right one—given that I admit the relative 
superiority of my professor’s ability (as well as that of the textbook authors)?  That’s the kind of 
epistemic blameworthiness I have in mind, illustrated with an extreme instance. 
 
                                               
9 Interestingly, this doesn’t apply to many non-philosophical cases.  Suppose I’m a physician who 
disagrees with 98% of a group of physicians I know to be my superiors regarding the case at hand.  I 
believe that treatment A is significantly better than treatment B; they all believe that B is significantly 
better than A.  A great deal rides on the decision of how to act; a life is in the balance.  If it turns out that I 
would be blameworthy to retain my belief, it should also turn out that I’m blameworthy to act on my 
belief.  This doesn’t, however, mean that I need switch to their judgment; I may reasonably act on their 
belief (going ahead with treatment B) while withholding judgment on whether B is better than A. 
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We tend to have two reactions to this example.  Reaction one: we think that since we philosophy 
professors are all pros now, the typical graduate student-professor chasm of competence or reliability 
no longer holds.  A graduate student disagreeing with a professor is one thing; one philosophy professor 
disagreeing with another is something else entirely.  But if you’re in the Epistemic Renegade situation, 
then you know that that’s erroneous for many of the topics on which you have opinions but are not a 
leading expert: there’s a chasm of understanding/competence separating me from Timothy Williamson 
on vagueness issues, David Lewis on metaphysics issues, David Chalmers on phenomenal consciousness 
issues, etc.  I don’t want to exaggerate: it’s certainly less of a chasm than in the case of the physics 
graduate student and physics professor!  (We’ll consider an interesting development of this idea in 
section 3.)  And whereas in the physics case virtually all the physics professors will agree on the answer 
to the physics problem, no such near universal agreement will hold in the philosophical cases.  But 
there’s a chasm of understanding and competence all the same.  There probably is no chasm for the 
areas in which one publishes with some frequency and success; but philosophers rarely restrict their 
philosophical beliefs to such areas.  Keep in mind that the renegade problem shows up with most 
frequency regarding areas outside one’s areas of maximum expertise; that’s where the problem has its 
bite.10 
 
As just noted, we know that in the case of philosophical research there almost never is an interesting 
situation in which the answer is clear to all the real experts, as there is in the physics case.  (Indeed, if 
the answer did become clear to all the experts, then eventually the answer would no longer be 
interesting, even if it started out interesting.)  Thus, our second reaction to the physics case is something 
like, ‘So because of the greater uncertainty or difficulty here in philosophy compared to graduate 
physics, I’m okay in disagreeing with the philosophical superiors.’  But it seems to me that that only 
suggests that you should have little confidence in your philosophical inclinations.  You should say, ‘Well, 
heck!  Given that in philosophical research we’re squarely in the realm of the exceedingly difficult and 
uncertain, compared to graduate physics, I should have less confidence in the opinion of the experts and 
that of myself, as I know I’m not nearly as good as those experts on these topics.11 
                                               
10 As a consequence, I won’t investigate the case in which you believe P but you have looked at all the 
reasons your superiors have offered in print to accept ¬P, you have given all their public arguments a fair, 
thorough, and expert examination, you are a genuine international expert in the area in question, and you 
have subsequently and expertly concluded that the public arguments aren’t very good; so you have 
retained your belief in P.  This is an interesting case, but it is different from the ones I examine in this 
essay because it is so exhaustive. 
11 A relevant difference between the physics and philosophy cases: whereas in philosophy it’s perfectly 
epistemically acceptable to pursue lines of research in conflict with the mature opinions of one’s 
epistemic superiors (because we can have little confidence that the superiors have reached the truth), the 
same is rarely true of the graduate physics student, since we have lots of confidence that her superiors 
 11
 
However, at this point I’m only asking you to understand the charge of epistemic blameworthiness being 
made of the reflective epistemic renegades, not believe that it is correct.  In subsequent sections, I will 
evaluate the charge. 
 
Here is another example, one that helps indicate what kind of blameworthiness I don’t have in mind as 
well as hinting at what kind might be applicable.  If Tom is a philosophy professor currently specializing 
in the philosophy of mind, and in 2010 he confuses eliminativism (no beliefs) with physicalist 
reductionism (beliefs are physical), then he is epistemically blameworthy in a professional sense.  Pros 
can do boneheaded things, including epistemic things.  But even though Tom is blameworthy, his kind of 
mistake seems importantly different from that of the reflective epistemic renegade.  Tom has made an 
error in his work, in his philosophizing; by being a reflective epistemic renegade, I seem to have made an 
error in my philosophical conduct, with my attitude towards my philosophizing.  This may make it sound 
as though I’ve done something morally wrong, but that isn’t right.  Tom’s mistake counts against his 
philosophical competence; mine seems to diminish my chances of philosophizing wisely. 
 
If my mistake lies in my attitude toward my philosophizing, as was just suggested, then perhaps I’m 
blameworthy because of my beliefs about my philosophical beliefs.  In particular, perhaps the (alleged) 
blameworthiness of my position in the Epistemic Renegade situation comes from my unjustified belief 
that my belief in P is more justified than Lewis’s belief in ¬P.  It might be thought that in order for me to 
continue to believe P in the Epistemic Renegade situation I must at least be disposed to think that Lewis 
has made some error that I’ve avoided, or that I’ve found some piece of evidence that he has missed or 
not fully appreciated, and as a result my belief in P is more justified than his belief in ~P.  Otherwise, why 
would I persist in my belief when I’m fully aware that my superior Lewis disagrees with me?  And it’s 
that belief disposition that is the source of my blameworthiness. 
 
I don’t accept that view—call it the Second-Order Belief view.  For one thing, it fails to target the right 
belief.  To see this, consider what I will call the “extreme renegade”.  He has examined a good deal of 
evidence concerning philosophical proposition P.  He concludes that P is true.  At this point he is not, 
however, aware of the opinions regarding P of many of his superiors (aware of some, perhaps, but not 
many).  It is a bit difficult to imagine such a situation now, with so much communication among 
philosophers, but of course the present communicatively rich situation isn’t necessary to philosophy.  He 
then comes across a recent poll of virtually all contemporary philosophers regarding P (as well as other 
propositions).  For the most part he knows who his superiors are.  There are 100 of them on the list, and 
he is able to spot every one of them (or, more realistically, nearly every one).  98 of his recognized 
superiors on the list think P is false.  That’s 98%!  Furthermore, of the 400 philosophers polled who are 
known by him to be neither superiors nor inferiors (on the topic in question), 392 think P is false (98% 
again).  Now you tell me: should the extreme renegade shift his position on P? 
                                                                                                                                                       
have reached the truth (keep in mind that this is run of the mill graduate physics, not cutting edge 
material). 
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The answer seems perfectly clear: only a foolish philosopher would fail to lower his credence in P; in 
fact, he would be foolish not to give up his belief in P entirely.12, 13  One might protest: what if the 98 
superiors all made errors in coming to their view, and he was epistemically perfect in his route to his 
opposite view?  He believes P for the “right reasons” while they believe ¬P for the “wrong reasons”.  In 
such a case surely he should stick with his view, and not give it up!  But no: it’s still the case that he is 
blameworthy in sticking with his belief.  His route to his belief isn’t blameworthy, but his retaining of his 
belief is blameworthy because his evidence regarding P has just suffered a huge transformation upon 
reading the poll results.  He has now obtained extremely good sociological evidence E1 (via the poll) that 
there are pieces of evidence E2 not sufficiently appreciated by him and against P that are so powerful 
that they convinced 98 out of 100 of his superiors that P is false.14   The rule ‘If you have come to believe 
P in an epistemically perfect way, and P is true, then you should keep your belief come what may’ is an 
excellent rule of thumb, but we can see that there are counterexamples.  Of course, the 98 superiors are 
blameworthy as well (not because they knowingly disagree with him but because of their route to their 
                                               
12 One can think of ridiculous counterexamples.  I start out with just three superiors regarding P, two 
agreeing with me and one disagreeing with me.  Then the disagreeing one perfectly clones himself 97 
times.  So, I end up with 98 disagreeing superiors and just two agreeing superiors.  Or, I discover that all 
98 superiors (no clones this time) believe ¬P only because they hate the two remaining superiors (in 
effect, the 98 are epistemic near-clones with respect to P). 
13 Why not just accept what they say, given that they are nearly unanimous on P?  I might do so.  On the 
other hand, I might not because of a general skepticism regarding our ability to reach the truth about 
philosophical claims.  When I say that so-and-so is my philosophical superior concerning P I am saying 
that they are better than me in several important epistemic respects, but I need not hold that they have a 
good chance of being right.  If I do have this general skepticism I probably will only rarely have any 
philosophical beliefs myself, and so the Epistemic Renegade problem will arise infrequently. 
14 Actually, E2 might not count as evidence under a narrow construal of ‘evidence’ (although E1 is 
evidence under any construal).  Throughout this essay I use ‘evidence’ in a broad if slightly non-standard 
way so as to include epistemic factors other than beliefs (e.g., experiences, reliability facts, etc.) that in 
some way help make beliefs not blameworthy.  However, in most cases we are investigating E2 will be 
ordinary evidence, as we are considering philosophical beliefs most of which are based on arguments.  If 
you insist, you can restrict the argument to cases in which E2 is ordinary evidence; the argument won’t 
diminish in interest.  In my Forthcoming I attempt to give a more theoretical answer the question ‘Under 
what conditions am I epistemically blameless/blameworthy in retaining my belief after I have discovered 
recognized peers or superiors who disagree with me?’ 
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belief), but the point is that he is blameworthy too (not because of his route but because of his reaction 
to his new evidence E1). 
 
My main point: the extreme renegade isn’t merely blameworthy in thinking that his belief in P is 
justified.  Or that his belief in P is just as (or more) justified as those of his superiors.  Or that his belief in 
P isn’t blameworthy.  Instead, the belief in P itself is blameworthy.  So the Second-Order Belief view is 
mistaken. 
 
Despite that consequence, I think there is something importantly right about the Second-Order Belief 
view, something having to do with the nature of wisdom.  As I stated above, if I’m blameworthy in virtue 
of being a renegade, then the problem seems to lie in my attitude toward my philosophizing.  The 
renegade is being foolish or unwise, but not stupid or blundering.  My guess is that the person who is a 
frequently blameworthy renegade is simply bad at appreciating what might be called elusive higher-
order evidence, and it is a (minor) mark of wisdom that one can appropriately appreciate such evidence.  
By ‘elusive higher-order evidence regarding P’ I mean this: purely testimonial evidence E1 that there is 
such-and-such significant evidence E2 regarding P, where E2 is utterly unknown to the subject despite 
her efforts (if any) to grasp it (so E1 is the higher-order evidence and E2 is the elusive evidence).  The 
excellent “first-order philosopher” can expertly evaluate loads of evidence concerning P but has real 
psychological difficulty dealing with the fact that others have plenty of evidence regarding P that she 
knows nothing about despite her efforts to grasp that evidence.  Often, these are philosophers who are 
excellent at “doing philosophy” but who simply can’t stand the thought that there might be strong 
evidence against their view that they don’t know about or have yet to sufficiently appreciate.  But “out 
of sight, out of mind” is a not a wise strategy in philosophy. 
 
One might wonder why I stick with ‘epistemically blameworthy’ instead of ‘epistemically unjustified’: the 
problem with the epistemic renegade is that she is unjustified in retaining her belief, so why not set 
blameworthiness aside?  I’m not against this substitution.  My main reason for focusing on blame is that 
I’m interested in the question ‘How should we conduct our philosophical lives?’  I’m interested in what 
we should actually do, how we should react, when we find ourselves in the epistemic renegade 
situation.  When the renegade is blameworthy it will often be due to the fact that she is unjustified, 
overall, in believing P (both propositionally and doxastically).  But in this essay I’m not so concerned with 
analyzing the reason why one may or may not be blameworthy (in unpublished work I consider the 
matter further). 
 
3.  When Renegades Are Blameless 
 
The conclusion suggested thus far is a partial answer to the age-old and quite personal question of what 
important beliefs we should have: when in the Epistemic Renegade situation, withhold belief; if you 
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don’t, you will be blameworthy.15  If a reflective epistemic renegade is not epistemically blameworthy in 
sticking to her guns, then there is some interesting explanation of that fact.  Prima facie, she looks 
blameworthy. 
 
However, that’s just a comment on appearances.  I don’t think there is any good reason to think the 
renegade is always blameworthy in sticking with her belief in P.  Neither do I think that the renegade is 
always blameworthy in not lowering her credence in P.  In this section as well as section 5 I’ll look at 
fourteen arguments for the conclusion that in at least some interesting cases renegades aren’t 
blameworthy.  I think ten of them aren’t good; they are examined in section 5.  In this section I will 
argue that there are at least four species of the Epistemic Renegade situation genus in which there is a 
good chance that the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy in virtue of being a reflective epistemic 
renegade and in some cases need not lower her confidence in P, even a little bit.16  In fact, these four 
“exception cases” provide the topic with much of its interest, at least in my judgment.  Keep in mind 
that in this essay we are focused on real-life scenarios; so highly idealized exception cases aren’t to the 
point. 
 
First species: undefended assumptions.  You believe P and successfully and knowingly trace the source of 
your disagreement with your disagreeing epistemic superiors such as David Lewis to a single and highly 
fundamental assumption, Q.  Lewis flags Q, admits that his entire case against P relies on Q, and 
sheepishly admits that although Q strikes him as true, and thus good enough to rule out P, he has 
absolutely nothing to say in its defense.  Q strikes you as false, and you may or may not have supporting 
arguments.  In this type of situation, perhaps you’re epistemically blameless in sticking with your (full 
confidence in your) belief in P—provided this works with all the other recognized epistemic superiors 
who deny P.  For you know that the only articulated reason against P is Q, and Lewis doesn’t have any 
articulated reason for Q.  I’m not sure about that, but let’s be generous and not challenge your 
                                               
15 Of course, there are legions of philosophers who are clearly epistemically inferior to Lewis, 
Williamson, Chalmers, etc. and yet who not only disagree with those superiors on the relevant topics 
outside their own expertise but will deny that those philosophers are their superiors with regard to the 
topics in question.  So they aren’t renegades in the sense characterized in this essay.  I suspect they 
usually are epistemically blameworthy, although I won’t argue the point here. 
16 Just because one is not blameworthy in virtue of being an epistemic renegade with respect to one’s 
belief that P doesn’t mean that one is epistemically blameless with respect to that belief, as one could be 
blameworthy in believing P in virtue of some other fact.  In addition, if one does reduce one’s confidence 
level (perhaps all the way to withholding belief entirely) as a result of being a renegade, this does not 
mean that one’s so doing is blameless, as one may have made blameworthy errors in one’s assessment of 
alleged superior opinion.  I’ve omitted these qualifications in the rest of the essay. 
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epistemic status in that situation.17  Even so, I don’t think this type of situation happens often (although 
it does happen).  For one thing, you need to have actually traced the source of the disagreement to that 
one fundamental point, you need to have noted the fact that the superior’s endorsement of that point 
has no backing reason, etc.  That’s a lot of work, and when it comes to philosophical positions outside 
our main areas of research we have rarely done that work. 
 
However, there is a similar situation that may appear to offer some hope for the renegade.  I trace 
Lewis’s argument for ~P to his reliance on Q, which I reject.  I now ask myself: is he my superior on Q?  If 
the answer is ‘Yes’, then nothing has really changed, as I’m still in the renegade situation.  But suppose I 
then find out that his argument for Q relies essentially on the truth of R, which I reject.  And I know that 
he is not my superior on R!  If we are rough peers on R, then I’m probably not helped very much in the 
matter of my blame status.  But if I know that I’m his superior on R, then everything changes: I no longer 
recognize him to be my superior on P or Q.  I know that I’m his superior on R, which means I probably 
have significant evidence ER regarding R that he lacks, but due to the relationship among P, Q, and R, my 
evidence ER that he lacks is now significant evidence against Q and ~P that he lacks, which means he is 
no longer my superior on either Q or P (or ~P).  This does not mean that I’m his superior on either P or Q 
(since he may still have significant evidence regarding P or Q that I lack), but it does mean that he is not 
my superior on P or Q.  Now my disagreement with Lewis doesn’t look so threatening.  However, even if 
all this is right, I wonder how often this kind of situation actually turns up.  I won’t try to adjudicate that 
matter here. 
 
Second species: forgiving percentages.  I am blameless when I know that my superiors agree with me by 
a ratio of 10 to 1, say.  I believe that Peter van Inwagen, Trenton Merricks, and Cian Dorr are wrong to 
believe that there are no chairs, and luckily for me there are at least 30 other metaphysicians who agree 
with me (pretend).  Although the epistemic credentials of the three (near) compositional nihilists gives 
me potent evidence that there is potent evidence for compositional nihilism, the credentials of the 30 
other metaphysicians gives me potent evidence that the case for compositional nihilism isn’t that strong 
and those three philosophers have made errors of some kind, even though they are among my 
recognized epistemic superiors when it comes to the metaphysics of composition.  Of course, if those 
three philosophers were head and shoulders the superiors of the 30 philosophers, and I knew that, then 
I couldn’t comfort myself with the 10 to 1 ratio, but let’s set that possibility aside.  So in some cases one 
is blameless in not at all diminishing one’s confidence in P even though one is perfectly aware of multiple 
                                               
17 This kind of case brings up the topic of epistemic “starting points”.  If you don’t have a reason to accept 
¬Q, then it might look somewhat arbitrary that you continue to reject Q while in full knowledge that 
Lewis accepts Q as his starting point.  But it seems to me that even if the charge of arbitrariness is correct, 
and one even admits it, that doesn’t mean that one lacks epistemic upstandingness in continuing with ¬Q; 
an arbitrary decision in starting points need not be epistemically unsightly.  Just because you lack a 
reason to prefer your starting point over Lewis’s does not mean that your starting point is blameworthy, 
or so it seems to me. 
 16
epistemically upstanding superiors who expertly believe ¬P!18  In this case it might be hard to see how 
the three metaphysicians can be reasonable in their belief in compositional nihilism.  But they might 
reasonably think they are the superiors of the other 30 metaphysicians. 
 
The case has some significant real-life application.  As graduate students in philosophy we often first 
hear about and study theses without knowing what the profession as a whole thinks of them.  Later we 
learn what other philosophers think; we also come to have views about our abilities compared to those 
philosophers.  For instance, suppose that working with standard philosophy of mind textbooks and 
articles as a graduate student I come to think that analytic behaviorism is false.  I have looked at a great 
deal of the relevant considerations but haven’t paid attention to what the profession thinks about 
behaviorism (this scenario was more realistic a few decades ago when there wasn’t so much 
communication among philosophers).  My belief is reasonable based on the epistemically significant 
considerations available to me.  Suppose I then discover that virtually all professional philosophers of 
mind over the last few decades have thought that analytic behaviorism is false; I consider these 
philosophers my peers or superiors with respect to the philosophy of mind generally and behaviorism 
specifically.  Naturally, I am reasonable in retaining my belief.  Still later I find out that there are a couple 
renegade philosophers of mind Smith and Jones who today believe analytic behaviorism is true even 
though they’re both aware of the reasons everyone else has rejected behaviorism.  I will of course find 
this a bit puzzling, since I know that Smith and Jones are high-quality philosophers (including being my 
superiors on the metaphysics of mental content and belief) who have looked at all the considerations I 
and the other peers and superiors have seen, but I’m hardly unreasonable, to any degree, in continuing 
to stick with my old belief that behaviorism is false.  There is nothing amiss in my inferring that it’s highly 
probable that they made some odd mistake somewhere, despite their credentials and their superiority 
over me.  After all, their opinion is outweighed by that of hundreds of other professional philosophers 
who still think that analytic behaviorism is false and do so even after looking at the arguments of Smith 
and Jones.   
 
Third species: fragile blamelessness.  As with the last species, this one may have fairly widespread 
application.  Some renegades are happy to admit that Lewis, for instance, has seen all the crucial 
evidence regarding P that they possess.  Their only beef with Lewis might be that he either made a 
mistake with that evidence or hit on some additional and misleading evidence that led him astray—
errors that they have been lucky enough to avoid.  These things happen all the time, even to the best of 
us.  Why can’t the renegade just point out that fact when explaining why she is sticking to her guns?  (I’ll 
explain the meaning of ‘fragile blamelessness’ below.) 
 
That may seem like an explanation that gets the renegade off the hook.  But if we apply the explanation 
generally, to many of my disagreements with Lewis for which I’m a reflective renegade, it seems to fall 
apart.  I end up saying that Lewis has made mistakes with evidence or has acquired misleading 
evidence—each of which I’ve avoided—on philosophical claims A, B, C, D, E, etc.  What amazing luck!  In 
                                               
18 I discuss cases similar to the one described in the text in my Forthcoming. 
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each case I, the average philosopher, have dodged philosophical mistakes that keep plaguing my 
epistemic superiors!  In fact, I should conclude that he isn’t my superior on these many issues in 
metaphysics.  And since there are many such issues, Lewis isn’t my superior at all in metaphysics.  But 
that’s silly.  For most cases, I haven’t the slightest reason to think that that Epistemic Renegade case is 
special in that I have avoided some mistake the epistemic superior has made.  Similar considerations 
show that I cannot defend myself by supposing or concluding that the epistemic superior has had an 
uncharacteristic bout of argumentative sloppiness or excessive bias.  I can’t reassure myself with this: 
such-and-such considerations C show that P is true; David thinks P is false; David knows about C (and he 
has sufficiently appreciated its import); so I guess David just really screwed up in thinking about the C-P 
connection; after all, he’s not infallible.  Neither can I reasonably believe that the superior hasn’t 
sufficiently appreciated the quality of such-and-such evidence.  In most cases, I have no special reason 
to think that any of these things have occurred.19 
 
The preface paradox threatens here to suggest that even when applied generally the ‘This is a special 
case or he is not my superior’ excuse is enough to escape blame.20  I encounter disagreements D1-D4 
with Chalmers on phenomenal consciousness issues; disagreements D5-D8 with Lewis on modality; 
disagreements D9-D12 with Sider on material composition; D13-D16 with Williamson on vagueness; D17-D20 
with van Fraassen on philosophy of science issues.  When D1 comes up suppose I think to myself ‘Well, 
this case is special in that Chalmers has just screwed up, or maybe he’s not my superior after all when it 
comes to this specific issue’.  Then suppose I do the same with D2, D3, etc.  But at the end of the day I 
admit that the ‘This is a special case or he is not my superior’ explanation is not true for all of D1-D20, as 
that’s so unlikely (I’m virtually certain that several of these people are my superiors on at least several of 
those particular propositions).  This combination of attitudes is inconsistent, but that might not mean 
that I’m guilty of any epistemic crime.  If you think that the solution to the preface paradox is that one 
can have justified inconsistent beliefs that are known by one to be inconsistent, then perhaps you’ll 
apply the same lesson here.  This isn’t crazy: the preface paradox does have a similar structure, and it 
                                               
19 On the same front, it is hopeless for me to argue thus: well, I thought that Chalmers, say, was my 
epistemic superior when it comes to the philosophy of phenomenal consciousness, but given that we 
disagree on these eight (say) crucial points, I guess he really isn’t my superior in that subfield—or at least 
he’s less reliably right than I initially thought.  For I don’t think that he’s my superior based on his 
conclusions.  I base it on many factors: how he conceives of certain issues, how illuminating his 
arguments are, the frequency and places he publishes, the amount and range of expert discussion he has 
engaged in, etc.  When I discover the extent of our disagreement, this won’t, or shouldn’t, shake my 
judgment of epistemic superiority unless the extent is enormous in the sense that many central changes 
would have to be made to my belief system in order to make it match his (so we don’t differ on just a 
couple fundamental assumptions from which the rest of our disagreement flows). 
20 Thanks to Ernie Sosa for drawing my attention to the relevance of the preface paradox. 
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isn’t implausible to hold that the paradox shows that one can have justified inconsistent beliefs that are 
known by one to be inconsistent.  In the preface paradox I come to have philosophical beliefs B1-B20 but 
since I know of my own epistemic weaknesses, I also strongly believe that I am mistaken in at least some 
of B1-B20.  In the “disagreement paradox” I initially come to believe B1-B20, I then come to believe, from 
the fact of disagreement, S1-S20, where SX is the proposition ‘This case X is special in that the epistemic 
superior with respect to BX just screwed up, or this alleged superior with respect to BX is not really my 
superior with respect to BX’.  But since I know of my own epistemic weakness compared to those 
philosophers, I also strongly believe that I must be mistaken in some of S1-S20. 
 
Of course, one might hold that the solution to the preface paradox is not that one can have justified 
inconsistent beliefs that are known by one to be inconsistent.  But even if that is the proper solution to 
the preface paradox, I suspect that the disagreement paradox is relevantly different from the preface 
paradox.  In the latter, one believes B1-B20 and has no strong particular reason for disbelieving any one 
of B1-B20.  Instead, one just has a reason—one’s fallible track record—for believing the negation of the 
conjunction of B1-B20, along with the negation of any other large conjunction of one’s beliefs.  But in the 
disagreement case one has a good particular reason to reject each of B1-B20: for instance, B1 is a 
proposition about phenomenal consciousness, David Chalmers and Ned Block are experts on 
phenomenal consciousness, I’m not as expert as they are on the topics involved in the proposition 
(recall the conditions on epistemic superiority), and they firmly disagree with me.  The fact that 
Chalmers and Block disagree with me on B1, combined with the fact that they are my epistemic 
superiors on the topics relevant to B1, very strongly suggests that there is good evidence E against B1 
that I’ve missed or failed to appreciate.  Upon learning their opinion I receive new and strong evidence 
that there is strong evidence against my belief B1 that has escaped me.  In my judgment, this is the key 
relevant feature separating the two cases.  In the preface paradox case, all I have is the general 
consideration of my fallibility, which counts as relatively weak evidence that there is good evidence 
against my philosophical belief P that has escaped me.21  In the disagreement case I have excellent 
evidence (the expertise and particular opinion of Chalmers and Block) that there is excellent evidence (it 
is probably excellent because it convinced Chalmers and Block) against my philosophical belief P that has 
escaped me. 
 
I don’t want to dismiss the ‘Well, this case is special in that the superior has just screwed up, or maybe 
he’s not my superior after all when it comes to this specific issue’ strategy entirely.  When I read an op-
ed in the New York Times that is written by a columnist I respect, I may justifiably think ‘She thinks P on 
the separation of Church-State issue; I have thought ~P for many years now; so I guess she isn’t my 
superior on that issue’.  This makes the strategy criticized above look applicable.  But in reality, although 
I may have a great deal of respect for the columnist, I never thought she was my epistemic superior on 
that issue, and that means that the epistemic renegade problem hasn’t even come up.  In fact, I think 
                                               
21 However, if one has excellent evidence that one’s philosophical judgment is horribly unreliable, then 
one should give up most of one’s philosophical beliefs—especially those that put one in the Epistemic 
Renegade Situation. 
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that regarding virtually any controversial issue in morality or politics, I have very few if any epistemic 
superiors writing in major newspapers in the world today.  I don’t think this is arrogance.  I judge these 
people to not be my superiors because I hold that on virtually every controversial issue in morality or 
politics I’m significantly more careful, unbiased, reflective, and objective than they are.  My IQ is 
sometimes lower than theirs, I’m often much less informed than they are on the uncontroversial issues 
pertinent to the controversial ones, I have often put less thought into the issue, and I definitely have my 
unreasonable biases and prejudices.  But I still come out much better than them on a whole stack of 
epistemically crucial features.  This has absolutely nothing to do with me specifically; it’s a benefit of 
training such as that found in philosophy coupled with political discourse’s relative lack of concern with 
evidence or rationality. 
 
Despite all those arguments I just gave, I think the renegade can blamelessly hold, on at least some 
particular occasions, that the superior must have made a mistake somewhere or run into some 
misleading evidence—as long as the renegade has never thought about the consequences of this idea 
when applied generally.  Keep in mind that although our renegade is reflective, she typically doesn’t 
spend a great deal of her time thinking about the epistemic consequences of philosophical 
disagreement.  Often enough, one’s belief is reasonable and blameless even though a moment’s 
reflection will make one seriously blameworthy if one retains the belief; that’s why the phrase ‘fragile 
blamelessness’ is apt.  (For instance, I might think that it’s perfectly clear that in Tyler Burge’s famous 
thought experiment for content externalism the medical doctors believe that arthritis is painful, even 
though it’s controversial whether the protagonist of the thought experiment, who doesn’t know that 
arthritis is inflammation of the joints, has that belief.  My blameless belief: it’s uncontroversial that the 
doctors have that arthritis belief.  Even though my belief is blameless, if someone shouts ‘Eliminative 
materialism!’ I should give up that belief, supposing, somewhat counterfactually, that I have significant 
numbers of epistemic superiors who accept eliminative materialism and the other “exception” cases 
don’t apply.)  Something similar may hold in the renegade case: her explanation of why she is sticking to 
her guns is reasonable even though a moment’s reflection will reveal its general inadequacy.  
Unfortunately, it takes very little reflection to see that when applied generally the upshot is that the 
people one thought to be one’s superiors keep ending up to be one’s inferiors, and it doesn’t take non-
stop or sophisticated reflection to see how implausible that is.  That is why I think this maneuver won’t 
often save us from the charge of blameworthiness. 
 
Fourth and last species: extreme reliability.  I am at a restaurant with friends.  Joe gets the bill and says 
that with tip the total is $288.  We decide to split the bill evenly among the six of us.  If I quickly do the 
math in my head, announce the answer $48, but then Joe says he got the answer $46, I will suspend 
judgment, as I should (cf. Christensen 2007).  Part of the reason: I know that I did the calculation quickly 
in my head, and I know that that method isn’t terribly reliable for me.  So it’s easy to tell the story in 
such a way one should suspend judgment.  But we can also tell the story in such a way that one 
shouldn’t suspend judgment, or so it seems to me (and Christensen would agree).  Suppose I actually 
worked out the calculation on paper, doing the long division neatly, fully, carefully, and to the first 
couple decimal places.  I also know that I’m fully sober, not sleep deprived, quite alert, etc.  Up until the 
point at which Joe announced ‘$46’, I would have insisted that Joe is not only just as generally capable 
 20
as I am when it comes to long division but that he is just as likely as me to get the right answer this time 
around—especially since I see that Joe is also slowly doing the calculation on a piece of paper and I have 
every reason to think that he’s just as sober and alert as I am. 
 
But after he announces his answer I’m not going to suspend judgment, and I don’t see anything odd 
about that.  As soon as he announces his answer I will probably have just a few obviously relevant and 
contending explanations in front of me: (a) despite being perfectly sober, alert, and doing the calculation 
quite carefully, I made an error; (b) despite seeming to be perfectly sober and alert, I’m either drunk or 
very sluggish; (c) despite my initially thinking that Joe is just as alert and sober as I am, he actually isn’t, 
or he has some other cognitive problem that’s currently interfering with his ability to do long division.  
(Naturally, there’s also the explanation that he is playing a joke on me, and thus isn’t really disagreeing 
with me at all, but let’s assume that I have done whatever is needed to rule that out as extremely 
unlikely.)  In a realistic scenario, I’m going to reasonably think that (c) is much more likely than the 
others because, after all, I don’t know about his alertness, sobriety, and current cognitive functioning as 
well as I know of my own.  Frankly, given that I feel perfectly fine in every way and I went through the 
problem with real care, I’m going to judge that it’s more likely that he isn’t really feeling up to scratch 
and as a consequence has made a mistake of some kind.  I’m not privileging myself in this judgment; I’m 
merely going by the impersonal odds.  Such a judgment might be incorrect, but it’s hardly unreasonable!  
After all, it’s a very simple math problem.  When he counters me with ‘But I’m fine!  I’m perfectly sober 
and coherent!  Really!’ I am going to guess that he’s really trying to save face, or he is unwittingly fooling 
himself.  I know that I’m perfectly well; in any realistic case I will not be capable of being as certain that 
he is perfectly well. 
 
It’s crucial to realize that in making this judgment on my behalf I’m not treating myself differently from 
how I’m treating Joe; I’m not engaging in some first-person bias.  Suppose the situation had been slightly 
different: I haven’t seen the bill, I have watched Joe and Moe do the calculation with equal care and 
thoroughness, and I have seen that Joe thinks the answer is ‘$46’ while Moe thinks it’s ‘$48’.  If my 
evidence that Moe is sober and alert is significantly better than my evidence that Joe is sober and alert, 
then I’m going to conclude that Moe is right and Joe is wrong (or, at least, I’ll put significantly more 
weight on Moe’s word than Joe’s word).  Now if we let Moe = me, we have the original situation 
described above. 
 
I think the same result holds for a case Feldman claims to offer clear support for his view (2006).  You 
are in my office and we both look out on the quad.  I seem to see perfectly well a person there with a 
blue coat on, and so I tell you that I see such a person.  You have a good look at the quad but then say 
there is no person there with a blue coat on; in fact, there’s no one there at all (so we are not just 
arguing over a borderline case of blueness or coatness or personhood).  I know that I feel perfectly fine 
and that the scene I seem to be seeing looks utterly normal.  Feldman says, rightly, that after 
encountering your opinion I should conclude that something strange is going on.  But he also says that I 
should suspend judgment on whether there is someone in the quad with a blue coat on.  This strikes me 
as implausible.  Obviously, I will initially think there is no disagreement, and you are pulling my leg.  If I 
can somehow rule that possibility out (it is not child’s play to tweak the example to make this task 
 21
realistically doable), then I will be faced with two obvious possibilities akin to (a)-(c) from the restaurant 
case: (d) I’ve temporarily lost my mind, even though I feel perfectly fine and everything seems utterly in 
order visually and with my reasoning skills, or (e) although you appear to me to be functioning perfectly 
well, you are functioning quite badly right now and your reports to the contrary are just plain false.  Just 
as in the restaurant case (e) will strike me as more likely than (d), and I don’t see anything unreasonable 
in my making that judgment. 
 
Even if all of what I just argued regarding the extreme reliability case is true, I wonder how much 
application it has in philosophy.  How often do we form our philosophical beliefs via processes we know 
to be extremely reliable—like in the arithmetic case?  The answer depends in part on what counts as a 
philosophical belief.  I think I have a laptop, and I formed the belief in what can be considered for the 
sake of argument an extremely reliable process, but I know that some metaphysicians think that there 
are no laptops—metaphysicians who are my epistemic superiors when it comes to the metaphysics of 
composition, identity over time, and the like.  (Thus, this species connects up with the skeptical 
argument given at the end of this essay.)  However, whereas in the restaurant and quad cases the 
disagreeing parties agree on the extreme reliability of sense perception and long division but disagree 
on who made a mistake in the particular execution of the process, in the philosophy-against-
commonsense cases there is disagreement concerning the reliability of the processes themselves. 
 
In the remainder of the essay I will do three things.  First, I’ll argue that the renegade situation occurs 
less often than one might think (in philosophy).  Second, I’ll present and try to counter arguments 
against my Unfavorable Thesis.  Finally, I will show how to use the Unfavorable Thesis to generate a 
novel and good argument for a novel kind of radical skepticism. 
 
4.  Reasons Why the Problem is Rarer in the Philosophical Realm than You Might Think 
 
By acknowledging and then setting aside the four species for which it is plausible that there is no blame 
in being a renegade, we have diminished the number of blameworthy instances of the Epistemic 
Renegade situation.  There are other facts that do the same thing. 
 
Even though one might repeatedly assert and defend P, with all sincerity and honesty, one may not 
actually believe P—to any degree at all.  For instance, I could be a presentist (roughly: only presently 
existing and atemporal objects exist in the core sense of existence) even though I don’t believe that 
presentism is true.  That may seem odd to a non-philosopher, but it will be familiar to any professional 
philosopher.  My commitment to presentism might well fall short of belief.  I may defend it, call myself 
‘a presentist’, and suspect that the current public evidence is in its favor, but I need not believe it’s true.  
There’s no requirement that I be sure enough to actually believe it.  So there is no epistemically 
blameworthy belief in presentism because there is no belief in presentism even in the presentist.22 
                                               
22 This case highlights a common sense of ‘disagreement’ that I am ignoring: I disagree with you (in this 
alternative sense) if I’ve argued in several articles for P while you have argued in several articles against 
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Related to this is the fact of conditionalized philosophical belief.  In an ordinary philosophical 
conversation I may say, ‘We know a priori that P’, but I need not believe exactly that.  If you challenged 
me with the work of superior philosophers who after thorough, fair, and competent reflection came to 
think that there is no a priori knowledge, I might, depending on the context, correctly declare your 
argumentative move out of bounds.  In doing so, I wouldn’t be conceding that I’m wrong or asserting 
that those experts are wrong.  I’d be saying that I wasn’t really disagreeing with them in the first place.  
All I really believe is something like this: if the notion of apriority is coherent and has applications in 
mathematics, say, then we know a priori that P.  In fact, I might think that there is no apriori knowledge 
whatsoever (in fact, I might be a complete skeptic about knowledge).  Philosophical discourse is peculiar 
in this manner, for in ordinary life when we sincerely assert P we tend to believe P, full stop.  But on 
many—not all—occasions in philosophy, our sincere utterances don’t match up with our beliefs in such 
a neat way. 
 
This phenomenon of conditionalized philosophical belief is relevant for three reasons.  First, it shows 
that even though I say P and my superiors say ¬P, very often I’m not really disagreeing with ¬P (and in 
many cases those experts aren’t disagreeing with P).  Second, a big portion of my philosophical beliefs is 
conditionalized.  Third, I’m often not aware of superiors who disagree with my conditionalized belief.  I 
really and truly believe that if Q, then P, but even though I’m perfectly aware of some philosophical 
bigshots who say that ¬P, I may be roughly familiar with the state of the art and yet unable to name 
anyone who thinks that Q is true and P is false—which is to say, I may be unable to identify any 
superiors who genuinely disagree with me.  In fact, when I believe that if Q then P and I learn that Kit 
Fine, for instance, says ¬P, I may legitimately wonder whether what he really holds is something of the 
form ‘If R then ¬P’, where there is no simple relation between Q and R.  The upshot is that the Epistemic 
Renegade problem is significantly rarer in philosophical discourse than one would think. 
 
Thus, there are two ways (no belief, conditionalized belief) in which evidence that the Epistemic 
Renegade situation is present can be misleading.  In addition, often when the situation really does arise, 
so I believe P and my superior believes ¬P, my belief is held so weakly that the epistemic sin, if any there 
be, is significantly lessened.  Philosophical beliefs are typically held with a degree of confidence much 
lower than that for our ordinary empirical beliefs.  For instance, I believe that Ronald Reagan was 
President of the US.  If confronted with the question, ‘What is the percentage chance that you’re wrong 
about that?’ I would reply with ‘Nearly 0%.’  I also believe (let’s pretend) that belief content doesn’t 
supervene on one’s intrinsic physical properties.  I really do believe it, instead of merely being somewhat 
inclined to believe it or having any other weaker pro-attitude regarding that proposition.  But if 
confronted with the same question, ‘What is the percentage chance that you’re wrong about that?’ I 
would reply with ‘Oh, I don’t know; maybe roughly 20 or 30%.’  I’m just not anywhere near as sure.  I’m 
about 70 or 80% sure that externalism is right; whereas I’m virtually 100% sure Reagan was President 
                                                                                                                                                       
P.  But this kind of disagreement is weak and epistemically uninteresting, as it need not involve any belief 
in the truth or falsity of P. 
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(the only remotely realistic possibility I can think of is that through some unnoticed glitch in procedure, 
he never legally became president).  The 70 or 80% is enough for belief, at least under one common 
notion of belief. 
 
It is due in part to the relative weakness of my philosophical beliefs (compared to beliefs such as the 
Reagan one) that they can be (at least nearly) epistemically upstanding even though knowingly held in 
opposition to philosophers who I admit are my philosophical superiors.  The lower the degree of belief 
in P the lower the hurdle for being epistemically upstanding in continuing to believe P in the face of 
recognized disagreement with recognized epistemic superiors.  Or so it seems to me! 
 
However, the above considerations don’t go far enough.  There are two reasons why.  First, many 
philosophers have in fact a very high degree of belief in philosophical claims they know are disbelieved 
by some of their recognized epistemic superiors.  Second, one might still ask how I can believe P even to 
a small degree when faced with contrary opinion that I recognize as coming from epistemic superiors 
(and I’m not in any of the four exception cases).  The “philosophical gods” say ¬P; how can I believe P at 
all when I know full well that they are my philosophical superiors and have worked on the question 
whether P much longer and more expertly than I have?23 
 
5. Attempts to Justify the Reflective Epistemic Renegade 
 
I think my main claims are not terribly unkind to us: if they are true, many of us aren’t epistemically 
horrible even if often blameworthy in virtue of being reflective epistemic renegades.  However, there 
are reasons for thinking that I have not been kind enough—arguments for thinking that some of my 
central claims and assumptions are false.  In this section I consider ten arguments against my 
Unfavorable Thesis.  It seems to me that the arguments fail.  However, each of them throws light on the 
issues and so makes a positive contribution to that extent. 
 
First argument.  If I do a complete and fair and professionally competent investigation into whether P is 
true, then I can hardly be epistemically blameworthy; for how much more could I be reasonably 
expected to do? 
 
However, in some sense there are no complete investigations for most interesting topics in philosophy.  
And even if there were some of kind of professionally relative notion of completeness that is frequently 
met (e.g., careful, thorough, and competent investigation of all or most of the clearly relevant literature 
to date), to assert that meeting the standard of professional completeness suffices for blamelessness is 
to just beg the question.  We want a robust explanation of why we are blameless, assuming we are 
blameless.  The Epistemic Renegade problem arises when we first see that competent, thorough, careful 
                                               
23 Finally, there are all the cases in which there is no disagreement because of equivocation, polysemy, 
inadequate grasp of concepts, or lack of truth-value.  I won’t comment on their frequency, although I can 
say that I think they are more common than it may appear. 
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professionals who have done well by professional standards still seem epistemically blameworthy in 
continuing to believe P when they recognize many epistemic superiors with respect to P who believe ¬P.  
And of course in most cases where we are in the Epistemic Renegade situation we haven’t done a 
professionally complete investigation! 
 
Second argument.  Philosophy is so hard that even the geniuses are very fallible and so shouldn’t be 
trusted; thus, I’m epistemically blameless in disagreeing with them. 
 
I think the point about deep fallibility is probably true; the philosophical gods are definitely not 
philosophical gods.  If they were, presumably they would agree with one another pretty often and we 
could take them at their word.  Hero worship is a big mistake in philosophy—at least it is when 
accompanied by belief in the hero’s views in spite of being in the Epistemic Renegade situation.  
However, the fallibility point only suggests that I—the mere mortal quite a bit distant from genius—am 
even more unreliable than they are.  The fallibility point can amount to a decent argument if developed 
into the third exception species from section 3 (fragile blamelessness), but mere fallibility of superiors 
provides no excuse. 
 
Often I will be in a position of knowing that some of my epistemic superiors are not merely fallible but 
massively mistaken on some topic.  For instance, as I understand it at least one of Chalmers and Dennett 
must be extraordinary wrong in their conclusions about phenomenal consciousness.  If I just pick and 
choose my assertions from the two of them, I will probably end up more reliably right in my conclusions 
than at least one of them (depending on how reliability is calculated); and I know this.  However, I don’t 
think that this fact adversely affects my reply to the second argument.  There is a lot more to a person’s 
philosophical view on a subject than the view’s conclusions.  Although I won’t defend it here, I suspect 
that there is actually a great deal of agreement among experts (regarding their areas of expertise) in 
philosophy, even if it isn’t easy to state the agreed-upon theses.  For instance, if asked to write a book 
for sophomores and juniors regarding the important questions, theories, concepts, examples, and 
arguments regarding their area of expertise, I suspect that most experts would make a lot of the same 
choices and assertions (perhaps even people like Dennett and Chalmers, to take two very different 
philosophers of mind).  Thus, when we relativize to area (philosophy of mind, epistemology, etc) it 
seems to me that I won’t be as reliable as Chalmers or Dennett on consciousness issues—even though I 
may even know that I’m probably more reliable than at least one of the two regarding my conclusions 
on consciousness (see also footnote 29 on being more reliable than the recognized superiors). 
 
Think of the scientific analogue.  Physicists A and B have very different views on quarks vis-à-vis gluons, 
say.  If forced at gunpoint to write down their top ten conclusions on quark-gluon theory, their lists 
would be utterly disjoint and mutually contradictory.  Even so, I know perfectly well that both A and B 
are internationally recognized experts on quark and gluon theory.  Suppose I am a physicist who 
specializes in low-temperature physics.  I know that either A or B is utterly wrong in their top-ten list, 
but this isn’t going to help me figure out what to do in the renegade situation with respect to either A or 
B. 
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Third argument.  Suppose that I hold that P and I’m frustrated because I just learned that Chalmers, 
Fine, Williamson, and Kripke all have held and argued for ¬P for years and for a variety of published 
reasons.  The Epistemic Renegade problem has come up.  I then consol myself with the information that 
virtually no one disagrees with my belief in Q.  Everyone in philosophy who is a peer or superior agrees 
with me on Q (the mind boggles!).  But then I reflect on the fact that it’s merely contingent that no 
superior disagrees with me regarding Q.  I realize that I’m just lucky that no actual contemporary 
superiors challenge my belief in Q.  I could have had just the evidence I actually have, and had acquired 
it in the very same fashion, and yet I could have been surrounded by several recognized epistemic 
superiors who believe ¬Q.  I don’t mean: in some logically remote world; I mean that the possibility is 
quite realistic.  After I’ve gone through this very real possibility in my mind, am I epistemically 
blameworthy if I don’t give up my belief in Q—or at least lower my degree of confidence in Q?  And 
since that would mean that virtually every philosophical belief of mine is blameworthy, which is quite 
unlikely, there must be something wrong with the idea that being in the Epistemic Renegade situation, 
with the actually existing epistemic superiors, makes one’s belief blameworthy (cf. Kelly 2006). 
 
I think this argument fails.  The reason that actual disagreement with admitted experts counts against 
my belief is twofold.  First, I believe that Q is actually true.  Second, actual disagreement with experts 
makes it highly probable that there’s actual good evidence for the actual truth of ¬Q.  We care what the 
experts think in part because, being experts, their belief on the matter will be informed by the evidence, 
broadly construed.  More specifically, long-term endorsement of a claim X by multiple experts for 
multiple reasons that have been gone over in public is an excellent indicator of good evidence for X; it’s 
also an indicator, albeit less impressive, that the overall available evidence concerning X favors X’s truth.   
So, the actual disagreement counts against my actual belief.  When I believe Q, I believe that Q is 
actually true (even if I believe Q is necessary), and I worry about the experts disagreeing with me 
because I know that there probably is some good evidence against Q that’s actually lying around 
somewhere.  Thus, I care about possible disagreement only if it provides some reason against Q’s actual 
truth. 
 
Now consider a real-life thesis.  Suppose Q is content externalism and pretend that none of my many 
actual contemporary epistemic superiors with regard to Q believes ¬Q.  Recall that in order for merely 
possible expert endorsement of ¬Q to put any pressure on my belief, such endorsement must indicate 
that Q might actually be false.  But can I imagine a world just like the actual world in which a significant 
number of my superiors have good reasons for endorsing ¬Q—reasons that exist in the actual world as 
well?  Not necessarily.  I can of course picture in my mind a bunch of my actual epistemic superiors 
giving talks and writing papers defending content internalism; I can do this with any claim whatsoever.  
But when I ask myself, ‘Yes, but might they be doing so for good reasons that hold in the actual world as 
well?’, it depends on the sociological facts concerning the claim involved.  When it comes to some claim 
that none of my many actual epistemic superiors (or peers) endorses, I have no good reason to answer 
the question affirmatively—provided that the actual, contemporary community of professional 
philosophers is huge (especially the number of my epistemic superiors regarding Q) and has investigated 
Q thoroughly.  But that condition will be satisfied for most any of my philosophical beliefs that I’m aware 
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of being denied by epistemic superiors, given that I’m a philosopher of ordinary abilities who doesn’t 
have revolutionary ideas (sigh).24 
 
The third exception species from section 3 (forgiving percentages) comes in here as well.  As mentioned 
in that section, I’m not blameworthy if my actual agreeing superiors outnumber my actual disagreeing 
superiors 10 to 1 (assuming the disagreeing contingent aren’t known by me to be the superiors of the 
agreeing contingent).  Thus, if the merely possible disagreeing superiors are supposed to suggest that 
I’m blameworthy, they can’t be outnumbered 10 to 1 by my merely possible agreeing superiors.  But 
how on earth am I supposed to figure out the ratio among merely possible people (especially when the 
numbers are infinite)?  Eventually I’m going to be forced to examine the actual world: how many 
superiors do I actually have regarding P; how many actual arguments regarding P have actually been 
thoroughly examined, etc.  Thus, just like before my attention has to go to the actual world. 
 
One could counter by arguing inductively: history has shown that for virtually any philosophical claim, 
even if no geniuses believe it at some point in history (or even during a lengthy period), it’s just a matter 
of time before a significant number of such geniuses endorse it—in the actual world.  Epistemicism is a 
good example, as are many contemporary positions in analytic metaphysics.  But I suspect that most 
people will think this inductive argument just isn’t very strong, at least not today and for most of the 
topics most of us work on.  There are many extremely intelligent and well-trained professional 
philosophers doing research now, and just about every remotely plausible view gets worked through by 
someone at some point—at least, and this point is crucial, this is true for any view that I might stumble 
upon (again, given my limited imagination as an average philosopher; and most of us are average 
philosophers).  For instance, if radical monism, the claim that there is only one concrete thing, is still 
virtually without followers who are my actual contemporary epistemic superiors, then although the 
inductive argument gives some reason to think that there is some actual evidence in its favor, this 
reason is weak.  Not zero, but small enough to not harm me as a reflective epistemic renegade.  So the 
claim stands: only actual disagreement provides any powerful reason for blameworthiness.  This does 
away with a crucial premise in the third attempt to justify being a renegade. 
 
Fourth argument.  Suppose you know of some argument for P that strikes you as excellent.  There is a 
nearly irresistible feeling of being right about an argument.  One experiences a real phenomenological 
feel in this kind of situation, a kind of intellectually charged quale.  Perhaps we should know better, at 
least after some experience, than to conclude that the argument is compelling, but when one is basking 
in the glow of an argument for P that repeatedly strikes one as sound, it is awfully hard to continue to 
appreciate the cold, hard truth that others—including epistemic superiors—have experienced the very 
                                               
24 Obviously, if there are many superiors who believe ¬P while I believe P, and they all die in a hurricane 
that hits a conference, then the Epistemic Renegade problem is still in force because their recent and 
actual endorsement of ¬P shows that there is actual and contemporary evidence for ¬P.  The superiors 
don’t have to hang around in order to threaten my belief. 
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same feeling when constructing arguments for the opposite conclusion.  Given how difficult, 
psychologically, it would be to sit back, after experiencing that “glow” about one’s argument, and 
temper one’s judgment with ‘But of course geniuses X, Y, and Z say ¬P; so I’d be foolish to just go along 
with the glow’, to some extent we are reasonable in concluding P.  It’s almost as though the glow 
precludes from serious epistemic processing one’s knowledge that there are epistemic superiors who 
disagree.  One’s natural psychological propensities simply force one to go along with the glow.  Although 
we have some power over our doxastic inclinations, it’s limited.  To demand that we resist the force of 
glow experiences is to make epistemic blamelessness too demanding. 
 
However, this won’t do.  Perhaps we can be excused for getting carried away with our own reasoning 
while in the thick of it.  “Hey!  My new argument shows why Williamson’s epistemicism is wrong after 
all!”  I personally find myself on occasion temporarily thinking things of the form, ‘Well, only an idiot 
would think ¬P given any competent assessment of the available evidence’ even though a moment’s 
calm reflection would force me to admit that in many cases there are many non-idiotic believers in ¬P 
who are aware of all that evidence.  But the question at issue in the Epistemic Renegade problem is 
whether we should continue to believe that Williamson is wrong—even when the glow is no longer 
occurrent.  By then one should sober up a bit, at least once one has reflected on the odds that one’s 
argument is the refutation of Williamson’s claim X (and keep in mind that according to our 
characterization of ‘epistemic superior’ Williamson would have to be familiar with your argument). 
 
Fifth argument.  Even if there weren’t these psychological propensities to follow the glow—or, more 
generally, to follow one’s intellectual abilities and deliverances—what else would we do in forming 
beliefs?  What’s the alternative?  It won’t do much good to just follow the experts, because they almost 
always disagree (and we often can’t figure out what they really believe anyway).  More to the point, if I 
didn’t follow my philosophical inclinations and abilities, how could I even be a philosopher who does 
research?  How would I proceed?  I have to go along with my own judgment. 
 
There is some truth in this argument.  In some sense, I simply must follow my inclinations, arguments, 
and glow experiences—even when they tell me to follow someone else or suspend judgment entirely.  
My Unfavorable thesis is, roughly, that when (a) your judgment tells you that P is true, but (b) your 
judgment also tells you that a group of epistemic superiors on the relevant issues all hold that P is false, 
then unless some moderately peculiar circumstances hold (e.g., forgiving percentages), you should give 
up or at least significantly weaken your belief in P.  But this is consistent with the event of your giving up 
P being a case in which you are “going with your judgment and trusting your instincts”, and not going 
against them.  Part of my judgment/instinct is (b); so the process of “going with my judgment” is not just 
going with (a) and ignoring (b).  In some sense, to trust oneself may not only be permissible but 
necessary, but it need not involve belief in the conclusions one is led to when one ignores the opinions 
of others.  In addition, we saw earlier (when discussing research and action) that giving up on P need not 
mean that one stops relying on it in one’s philosophizing.  Is there any good reason why an experienced 
philosopher can’t produce good philosophy with real passion and interest and yet often refrain from 
belief in philosophical claims?  Can’t we follow our own noses and yet refrain from belief—when we see 
that recognized epistemic superiors deny those beliefs?  Is there any good reason why we must “land” 
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on the conclusions of our arguments and basic philosophical inclinations, thereby believing them, 
instead of just “hovering” over them and seeing where the arguments have led us?25  I’m tempted to say 
that although we can to a certain extent let our abilities, inclinations, and glow experiences guide our 
research—we simply must act, and in making the decision we are trusting ourselves—in doing so we 
really should withhold belief and be more cautious once we discover or remind ourselves that some of 
our recognized epistemic superiors disbelieve the claim we’re inclined to believe.  “Hovering”, with its 
suspension of belief, is an obvious and attractive alternative to belief.26 
 
Sixth argument.  As a matter of brute fact, our practice in philosophy is to keep our beliefs, even in the 
Epistemic Renegade situation.  That’s the way it’s been done around here for centuries.  PhD students 
are encouraged to formulate and defend their own philosophical opinions (although this was false a few 
centuries ago), and I don’t suppose that anyone criticizes them for disagreeing with David Lewis, 
Timothy Williamson, and the rest even when the students are wise enough to admit that those 
philosophers are their superiors on the relevant topics.  So, how can we blame individuals who persist in 
this epistemic practice?  Perhaps from some God’s-eye perspective our profession is blameworthy for 
engaging in this practice, but it’s hard to believe that the average philosopher is blameworthy in just 
going along with the generally accepted way of doing things—a practice that has been in force for 
centuries.  Surely the PhD student isn’t blameworthy, and wouldn’t it be asking too much to demand 
that the average professor go against the system in order to escape blame?  Perhaps withholding belief 
when on the cusp of the Epistemic Renegade situation is praiseworthy, but it’s a stretch to say that 
failing to do so is blameworthy. 
 
I don’t agree with that argument.  For one thing, I don’t think that is our practice.  As stated in section 4, 
I think many of us avoid the situation for many of the philosophical claims we’re attracted to and 
defend.  I realize that it looks as though we fall into the situation almost constantly, if one examines just 
our publications and presentations.  But since it’s tedious to include in one’s writings or talks dozens of 
clauses akin to ‘It seems to me’, the lack of belief in essay theses is often difficult to detect—for 
outsiders anyway. 
 
                                               
25 I think there is such reason in many cases outside of theoretical philosophy.  One’s weakly held beliefs 
don’t engage action nearly as well as one’s strongly held beliefs.  It’s even worse when I have to act on 
the assumption P when I don’t believe it (even weakly) but merely think it has a real chance at being true.  
So in order to act one might, psychologically, need belief instead of some doxastically weaker mental 
state.  But I don’t see much reason for this when it comes to my opinions on content externalism, four-
dimensionalism, presentism, evidentialism, Millianism for belief contexts, and many other philosophical 
views.  Thanks to Allan Hazlett for illumination on this point. 
26 It should be clear at this point that I am not saying that suspension of belief is always the option to take; 
don’t forget the Favorable Thesis defended in section 3. 
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In addition, the sixth argument is slightly ironic.  Everyone agrees that philosophy is a highly 
individualistic enterprise, despite our recent embrace of the method of working on issues as a large 
group.  We aren’t supposed to be epistemic sheep; we aren’t supposed to just take something on Kant’s 
authority, for instance.  We are supposed to bushwhack our own way through the philosophical thickets.  
When I hear elaborations of the sixth argument they are often peppered with appeals to the 
individualistic nature of philosophizing.  And yet, the defense of our continuing to believe P when we’re 
fully aware of how Lewis, Williamson, and Chalmers have each believed and argued for ¬P for years, 
comes to this: ‘Well, proceeding in an individualistic vein is what everybody does’? 
 
I think the point about individualism is right: we are supposed to follow our own noses, regardless of 
where they lead us.  (Recall the remarks about the research renegade made earlier.)  But we are also 
supposed to follow the evidence when we have it staring in our faces.  And if we know that a bunch of 
people we know to be our epistemic superiors believe ¬P, then we have truly excellent evidence that 
there is good reason to refrain from accepting P.  I realize that in some situations we have good reason 
to think that that “truly excellent” evidence is misleading; I have described some of those situations in 
section 3.  However, those situations are exception cases.  Given that we are blameworthy if we fail to 
follow evidence actually recognized as evidence, I think in most cases we would be blameworthy in the 
Epistemic Renegade situation even if it were our profession’s practice to not avoid the Epistemic 
Renegade situation. 
 
I suppose that if one just can’t stop oneself from retaining beliefs in the Epistemic Renegade situation, 
then one is less guilty.  But not absolved entirely.  I want to say: if you’re a professional philosopher 
who’s been around the block and who falls into the Epistemic Renegade situation, then you should have 
the ability to work productively and yet withhold belief—at least when it comes to philosophical beliefs.  
If you don’t have that ability, then you’re epistemically blameworthy; it’s a skill you should have 
obtained by now. 
 
Seventh argument.  It’s plausible that if you genuinely and justifiably believe that you have come up with 
an entirely new argument for P, you justifiably believe that almost no one else has even considered your 
argument, and your argument has recently gained some expert acceptance (via some journal referees 
for instance), then you are less blameworthy than someone who believes P on the basis of 
considerations they know full well have been thoroughly digested by the experts who believe ¬P.  Surely 
that’s right!  And since the envisioned scenario is relatively common as well, this fact will let many 
renegades off the hook. 
 
There are four problems here.  First problem: I suspect that although the antecedent of the argument’s 
main principle is certainly satisfied on some occasions, in most cases in which the Epistemic Renegade 
problem has been generated the antecedent is true only if we omit the occurrences of ‘justifiably’.  We 
may justifiably believe that our argument is novel, but until it has passed through the gauntlet of peer 
review (and I don’t mean just a referee or two, even at the most respected journals and academic 
presses), we rarely have much reason to think it’s very good.  It looks great to you, and the referee and 
editor of such-and-such journal liked it, but let’s not get carried away.  Second problem: in many other 
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cases we’ll have some or other articulated reason behind our endorsement of P—when challenged 
about our opinion we have something to say in response—but we are fully aware that when formulated 
in print our reasons would hardly amount to something even publishable.  Third problem: in still other 
cases we’ll fully admit the hard truth that we disagree with David Lewis on some metaphysical matter 
even though we don’t pretend to have any argument that Lewis (and Ted Sider, Kit Fine, etc.) just 
haven’t had the pleasure of seeing.  So, the renegade problem certainly hasn’t gone away.  Finally, the 
argument is a non sequitur: in the envisioned circumstances your superiors don’t have your new 
evidence (viz. your new argument), and this means that the people who used to be your epistemic 
superiors no longer have that status. 
 
Eighth argument.  Reiterating my reasoning regarding the epistemic situation of the renegade leads to 
interesting thoughts, some of which may suggest that my claims are defective in some way.  Imagine a 
situation with all the following idealized features (it can be made moderately realistic).  You have 100 
epistemic superiors regarding P.  Of these, 80 are what I’ll call mutual negative peers: for any two of 
them, neither is the superior of the other.  The remaining 20 are superiors of the 80 and are themselves 
mutual negative peers.  Each of the 100 knows of the two groups and knows which group they are in.  
You also know of the superiority and negative peer facts just mentioned.  On Monday night almost no 
one in the group knows what the others think regarding P.  (This is unrealistic of course: we are the ones 
writing the essays discussing P that each of us reads.  But suppose none of us had spent much time 
reflecting on who thinks what regarding P.)  On that Monday night a poll is taken of the 100 
philosophers, asking them for their degree of confidence in P’s truth.  Each of the 80 responds truthfully 
with ‘50% sure’; each of the 20 responds truthfully with ‘90% sure’.  That night your response, if anyone 
had bothered to ask you, would have been ‘50% sure’.  The poll is published the next day, Tuesday, at 
noon, and all 100 philosophers read it.  So do you.  That afternoon you think to yourself ‘Gee, those 80 
super-folk agree with me, but those 20 super-duper-folk are much more confident in P.  I’ll bet they 
know something the rest of us don’t.  Now I’m more confident in P than I was before.  If anyone asks, 
my degree of confidence is 70%’.27  But each of the 80 philosophers went through similar reasoning that 
afternoon after reading the poll results.  Each of them thought ‘Gee, those 79 peers agree with me, but 
those 20 superiors are much more confident in P.  I’ll bet they know something the rest of us don’t.  
Now I’m more confident in P than I was before.  If anyone asks me again, my degree of confidence is 
70%’.  That night the pollsters call the 100 philosophers again and ask them the same question regarding 
P that was asked on Monday night.  Everyone answers truthfully: the group of 80 responds with ‘70% 
sure’ and the group of 20 respond with ‘90% sure’ (so the latter folk don’t change their minds).  The new 
poll is published the next day, Wednesday, at noon, and all 100 philosophers read it.  So do you.  Now 
you see the new results: the 80 say ‘70% sure’ and the 20 say ‘90% sure’.  What are you supposed to do 
with this new information?  And what is the group of 80 supposed to do with the new information? 
 
                                               
27 I don’t think there is a unique confidence level dictated by rationality plus evidence, even if there is one 
dictated by perfect or maximal rationality plus evidence. 
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It might be thought that the defender of the Unfavorable Thesis should say that these philosophers 
should increase their confidence levels again.  Perhaps the group of 80 should increase their confidence 
levels to 80%.  And if we reiterate the process again, the confidence levels should go up again.  And of 
course that seems dubious! 
 
But nothing I’ve tried to say in this essay leads to this outcome.  For instance, although my Unfavorable 
Thesis (‘If one is a reflective epistemic renegade with respect to one’s belief in P, and one isn’t in any of 
the four exception cases, then one’s retaining P is blameworthy’) is intended to recommend that when 
one gets into an epistemic renegade situation one should alter one’s confidence toward that of the 
superiors, when the second poll comes out one is not in a new epistemic renegade situation.  At least, 
that’s how I have been conceiving ‘epistemic renegade situation’.  The first poll gave you new and good 
evidence that suggests that P is more probable than you originally thought.  But the second poll doesn’t 
do that.  All it does is show that the 80 philosophers followed their new evidence (supplied by the first 
poll) roughly as anticipated.  One should alter one’s opinion in response to information about the 
opinions of epistemic superiors only if that information gives one new and significant evidence regarding 
P.  So, with the second poll you have no additional good reason for further increasing your confidence 
level in P.28 
 
It must be said that the second poll could supply you with additional good reason, though, depending on 
the details of the second poll and how you interpret it.  Suppose that in the second poll it was revealed 
that each of the 80 moved their confidence levels all the way to 90%.  And suppose I knew full well that 
each of those 80 philosophers is a fiercely independent thinker (and perhaps they know that God is one 
of the 20).  I would then strongly suspect that the group of 20 has some members who are much 
smarter than I originally thought on Tuesday (remember that I increased my confidence level to just 70% 
upon reading the first poll).  Thus, the second poll might give me some relevant new information that 
should lead me to alter my confidence level once again.  But in this example the regression ends here. 
 
Ninth argument.  Consider a third thesis, modeled on the Unfavorable Thesis: 
 
Thesis (3): Suppose that if S were to come to believe P, then S would be a reflective epistemic 
renegade with respect to P and S would not be in any of the four exception cases with respect to 
P.  Then if S came to believe P, her holding that belief would be blameworthy. 
 
Frank is a contemporary epistemologist who is initially attracted to thesis (3) but he has yet to make up 
his mind on it.  He also knows that in his philosophical community a bunch of contemporary 
epistemologists think thesis (3) is false—epistemologists who are his recognized epistemic superiors 
when it comes to (3).  He also knows that he isn’t in any of the four exception cases mentioned earlier.  
So he knows both of the following: 
 
                                               
28 I discuss cases like this one in more detail in my Forthcoming. 
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(i) If I come to believe (3) then I will be a reflective epistemic renegade with respect to my 
belief in (3) and I will not be in any of the four exception cases with respect to (3). 
(ii) If (a) (3) is true and (b) if I come to believe (3) then I will be a renegade with respect to 
(3) and I will not be in any of the four exception cases with respect to (3), then (c) given 
my peculiar circumstances if I came to believe (3) my holding that belief would be 
blameworthy. 
 
He knows (i) because he is familiar with his philosophical community, his place within it, and his own 
doxastic self.  He knows (ii) because he sees it’s a logical truth.  Now (ii) is [(a) & (b)]  (c) and (i) is just 
(b).  Thus, since Frank knows (b) and he knows [(a) & (b)]  (c), he can, if he puts this all together 
properly, conclude (a)  (c): 
 
(iii) If (3) is true, then given my peculiar circumstances if I came to believe (3) my holding 
that belief would be blameworthy. 
 
Now what is Frank supposed to do about (3)?  We have already distinguished the reflective epistemic 
renegade from the reflective research renegade, noting the lack of reason to think the research 
renegade is blameworthy.  The reflective epistemic renegade with respect to P is within her rights to 
assume P is true in her research; this applies to (3) just as well as any other philosophical principle.  But 
this won’t get us off the hook entirely.  Say Frank is attracted to (3) and thinks that he should arrange his 
doxastic life in accord with it (as it implicitly recommends that he refrain from some beliefs in certain 
circumstances).  But he knows that if (3) is true, then he would be blameworthy to believe it (i.e., he 
knows (iii)).  How on earth can he rationally arrange his doxastic life around a principle that tells him 
that he’d be blameworthy to believe it?  This looks pretty suspicious, which makes one think that (3) may 
well be false in Frank’s scenario in which it is disbelieved by a significant number of epistemologists.  But 
if it is false in that scenario, it is probably false in the actual world at the present time (perhaps such 
epistemic principles are relative to epistemic practices; so one has to be careful with the inference from 
‘P is false in world 1’ to ‘P is false in world 2’).  Finally, if thesis (3) is actually false, then my Unfavorable 
Thesis may be actually false as well. 
 
That objection, which I dub the Self-Application Objection, looks good, although I think we can see that 
there must be something wrong with it.  Consider again the extreme renegade from section 2, who 
knows that 98 of his 100 superiors and 392 of his 400 peers disagree with him.  I don’t suppose anyone 
rejects this principle R: if someone is an extreme epistemic renegade with respect to P, then her holding 
that belief P is blameworthy.  And yet, what if you were in a (admittedly weird) philosophical society in 
which you believed R, you had 100 recognized epistemic superiors regarding R, you weren’t in any of the 
exception cases, and you found out that 98 of those superiors (who are fiercely independent thinkers) 
firmly believed that R is false?  That is, what happens when R applies to itself?  Running through the line 
of argument that Frank went through, you end up concluding this: 
 
If R is true, then if I came to believe R my holding that belief would be blameworthy. 
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If the Self-Application Objection shows that (3) is actually false, then since the two cases (i.e., (3) and R) 
are so similar it must show that R is actually false.  But R is true in the situation envisaged, right?  
Moreover, I suspect it would be true in the actual world as well (this isn’t to say that it’s a necessary 
truth).  So, there probably is something wrong with the Self-Application Objection, although this little 
argument isn’t conclusive and doesn’t tell us where the flaw is. 
 
It’s important to see that this problem applies not merely to (3), R, and the Unfavorable Thesis.  If you 
accept any thesis T of the form ‘If such-and-such conditions obtain with respect to one’s belief in P, then 
one should withhold belief in P’, then provided the antecedent of T can be true when P = T, then you 
have to deal with a version of the Self-Application Objection.  The probability that some such principle T 
should be true gives us good grounds to think that there must be something amiss with the Self-
Application Objection. 
 
Independent of those counterarguments, I think I have a more direct response to the objection.  
Consider again the conclusion (iii) that Frank has reached: 
 
If (3) is true, then given my peculiar circumstances if I came to believe (3) my holding that belief 
would be blameworthy. 
 
At this point Frank is faced with two interesting questions about (3): 
 
(A) What position am I going to take with regard to (3)’s truth-value? 
(B) Am I going to arrange my doxastic life in accord with (3)?  That is, (3) implicitly 
recommends that one withhold belief in certain circumstances; am I going to act on that 
recommendation? 
 
Before I try to answer those questions, let me make explicit the obvious point that one might not have 
any peers or superiors who disagree with one regarding (3).  For instance, that’s the way things are now; 
after all, almost no one has ever even considered (3).  Or, one might be a top-notch expert with no peers 
or superiors who deny it, even though they have considered it.  In such cases, one might be perfectly 
permitted to believe it. 
 
Let me step in for Frank here, as I clearly have an attraction to (3) and I can imagine being an epistemic 
renegade with respect to (3).  Yet, since I’m generally disinclined to believe highly ambitious 
philosophical principles (ambitious compared to many other philosophical principles), whether or not 
they put me in the epistemic renegade situation, I am also somewhat disinclined to believe (3).  
Furthermore, the Self-Application Objection makes me even more wary of (3).  I see that (3) applies to 
itself, and I am reminded of various semantic and epistemic paradoxes that tend to go with self-applying 
principles.  Due to these two factors (disinclined towards ambitious philosophical principles, wary of 
self-applying philosophical principles), I don’t go so far as to believe (3).  I withhold judgment.  Not only 
 34
do I answer ‘I don’t know’ to ‘Is (3) true?’ but also to ‘How much credence do you put in (3)?’  That’s my 
answer to (A). 
 
Let me make it clear that I’m not led to suspension of judgment in this way: 
 
I can see the truth of the conditional C that if (3) is true, then I shouldn’t believe it.  I think (3) is 
true; that is, I accept C’s antecedent.  Thus, since I accept C as well as C’s antecedent, I have to 
accept C’s consequent: I shouldn’t believe (3).  So, I won’t believe (3).  I’ll suspend judgment. 
 
That looks incoherent.  If I suspend judgment on a principle, any principle, it might be due to my 
following the recommendation in (3).  But in the case at hand although I am suspending judgment on (3) 
I am not doing so because I’m following the recommendation in (3).  I’m doing it for another reason 
entirely.  I’m suspending judgment on (3) due to my long-standing commitment to the following rule of 
thumb: 
 
If you are inclined to agree with a philosophical principle, but then you realize that it’s pretty 
ambitious, worrisomely self-applying, and confusing (for you), then you should suspend 
judgment on it. 
 
What about question (B)?  Just to make the question live, suppose that before writing this essay I was a 
reflective epistemic renegade pretty often.  Then, after writing the essay up to the beginning of the 
presentation of the Self-Application Objection, I’m strongly attracted to (3).  At that point I’m thinking 
that I should change my ways: from here on out I won’t be a reflective epistemic renegade (unless I am 
sure I’m in one of the exception classes) and I will arrange my doxastic life so that I avoid the 
blameworthiness alleged by the Unfavorable Thesis as well as thesis (3).  But now that I have had these 
puzzling thoughts about (3), brought about by the Self-Application Objection, am I going to change my 
ways or not? 
 
My answer is that I am going to change my ways.  I’m going to act in accord with (3).  As already 
mentioned, I don’t believe (3) is true.  But I do think it is closer to the truth than other principles (such 
as: it’s virtually always okay to be a reflective epistemic renegade).  I don’t mean to suggest that it has a 
high degree of truth but less than 1 (where degree 1 is the full truth).  It might be perfectly false, 
whatever that means.  What I base my decision on, and have confidence in, is the idea that (3) is in the 
vicinity of an important truth.  I think (3) is a good rule of thumb, where all that means is that it’s in the 
vicinity of a truth (endorsing a rule of thumb doesn’t mean endorsing its truth). 
  
Now of course I could be dead wrong about that: (3) isn’t in the vicinity of an important truth.  But just 
because I’m wrong about it, doesn’t mean I’m blameworthy in the sense discussed in this essay. 
 
Tenth and final argument.  You might think that what distinguishes Lewis and Williamson from yourself 
has nothing to do with their increased chance at philosophical truth or philosophical justification.  You 
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may believe that their superiority results in their having comparatively stronger philosophical merits 
such as: 
 
 Being more prolific 
 Being better at coming up with new views and arguments that aren’t obviously wrong or 
unsound and are worth thinking about 
 Being better at generating new concepts that increase insight into old philosophical 
problems 
 Noticing more, and more deeply, problems and connections that are important yet were 
unknown beforehand 
 More frequently supporting various interesting and new philosophical ideas 
 
That’s just a sample of relevant characteristics, but it’s enough to make the initial point, which is that 
you might implicitly think that although Lewis is your philosophical superior in many ways—so you are 
not arrogant in that respect—he is no better than you (or not significantly better than you) when it 
comes to evaluating the truth-value of philosophical ideas—at least when we spell out ‘better evaluator’ 
with ‘more reliably correct evaluator’.  And then you might implicitly think that you are epistemically 
blameless in disagreeing with him, as you are not aware of anyone who disagrees with you and has a 
better chance at being right. 
 
There are two relevant issues here.  First, there is the question of whether such a parity-of-reliability 
belief on the part of the renegade is reasonable or true: am I right in having this view of Lewis compared 
to myself?  Second, there is the question of whether the parity-of-reliability belief’s truth or 
reasonableness helps the renegade escape blame. 
 
Regarding the first issue, it is improbable that the parity-of-reliability belief could be true or even 
reasonable.  How likely is it that you reasonably believe that your recognized epistemic superior—who 
you’ll remember is someone you know (a) to be generally more informed than you are on the topics 
involving P, (b) to have more raw intelligence, (c) to have thought and investigated whether P is true 
longer and in more depth than you have, (d) to have thought about and investigated the topics 
surrounding P longer and in more depth than you have, (e) to be just as or even more intellectually 
careful than you are, and (f) to have understood and fairly and thoroughly evaluated virtually all the 
evidence you have seen regarding P (and usually much additional evidence)—is no more likely to get P’s 
truth-value right than you are?  This scenario seems highly unlikely (think of non-philosophical 
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analogues).29  We can retain the idea that if you and the superior had been presented with the exact 
same pot of evidence and other relevant considerations she would be no more likely than you to get P’s 
truth-value right.  But since she is your superior, such a situation doesn’t apply. 
 
Even if such a belief could be reasonable, surely you are in no position to think that you have a 
significantly better chance than the epistemic superior does to get P right.  Maybe all her epistemic 
advantages fail to increase her chances at finding the truth about P; this would be an odd and very 
depressing fact about the activity of philosophizing.  But it’s hard to see how in the typical case you 
could justifiably think she is considerably less likely than you to get P right.  And if that’s so, then the fact 
that she disagrees with you is still awfully worrisome.  All I’m saying here is that the mere fact that you 
think, even justifiably, that the superior is not more reliable than you isn’t sufficient to get you off the 
hook.  One might think that because our renegade justifiably thinks that her epistemic superior is not 
more relevantly reliable means that we have returned to the epistemic peer problem, briefly discussed 
in the section 1.  However, the renegade and her superior are still not peers, in any of the senses of 
‘peer’ discussed in the literature.  But perhaps we have now hit upon the best non-factive notion of 
recognized epistemic peer: person A justifiably believes that person B is equally likely to get P’s truth-
value right (before A finds out what B actually thinks about P). 
 
6.  A Surprising Application 
 
Presumably, if one is blameworthy in continuing to believe P, in the sense of blameworthiness we have 
been discussing, then one doesn’t know P, even if P is true.  If that’s right (I won’t attempt a defense 
here), and if my Unfavorable Thesis is true too, and if it’s also true that significant expert philosophical 
endorsement of a purely philosophical thesis typically supplies good testimonial evidence for that thesis 
(that last claim might strike one as controversial), then we have an intriguing result: kinds of radical 
skepticism quite different from traditional versions. 
 
Consider possible cases in which (a) the Epistemic Superior situation has come up with respect to my 
belief in P, (b) I’m not in one of the exception classes, and (c) P is something commonsensical such ‘I 
have a laptop’, ‘Mary believes that Jon is a moron’, ‘Torture for political gain is morally wrong’, ‘2 + 2 = 
4’, ‘Tom knows that our sun is an ordinary star’ or any other claim obviously inconsistent with 
compositional nihilism (almost no composite objects, or at least no composite artifacts; Rosen and Dorr 
2002), moral error theory (no positive, first-order, substantive moral truths), eliminative materialism (no 
beliefs), mathematical error theory (no positive, first-order, substantive mathematical truths), semantic 
                                               
29 However, what if you are a “commonsense” philosopher in that the only beliefs you stick with have the 
full backing of today’s best science and the commonsense opinion of virtually every culture throughout 
history?  You believe in trees and that 2 + 2 = 4, but not much else.  Perhaps you are significantly more 
reliable than philosophers who don’t have such scruples, but not many philosophers are so doxastically 
frugal. 
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nihilism (no claims made with vague terms are true; Sider and Braun 2007), or traditional skepticism 
(virtually no knowledge).  So, we’re considering claims at odds with anti-commonsensical theories 
whose adherents are members of philosophical communities in which there are significant numbers and 
percentages of genuine philosophical experts who truly believe those anti-commonsensical theories.  (I 
am not saying that our present, 2009, philosophical communities meet any of these conditions (this is a 
sociological matter), but of course they might in the actual future and easily do so in close possible 
worlds.)  Then not only am I blameworthy for continuing with my belief in P, but my belief fails to 
amount to knowledge.  Thus, I don’t know that I have a laptop, that 2 + 2 = 4, that Mary believes that 
Jon is a moron, that I believe that Jon is a moron, that I’m in pain, or just about anything else.  Clearly, 
this new skepticism is in some respects more radical than the traditional ones, as it denies more 
knowledge (you can’t even know that dogs are dogs or that 2 + 2 = 4, provided semantic nihilism and 
mathematical error theory are expertly endorsed in the right way).  However, the new skepticism is 
purely contingent as it depends on the nature of the philosophical circles one is a member of (and thus 
might not actually apply to any of us right now).  Furthermore, if the relevant experts change their 
minds appropriately (finding serious problems with the anti-commonsensical theories), then the way is 
clear for my belief to amount to knowledge.  Virtually all of your knowledge can be sabotaged due to 
contingent socio-epistemic facts.  And even if this is wrong, so your beliefs continue to meet whatever 
conditions are sufficient for knowledge (perhaps knowledge isn’t all it’s been cracked up to be), the 
knowledge in question will be blameworthy and surely not as epistemically good as knowledge 
untainted by recognized superior disagreement.30, 31 
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